A STUDY OF MYTH

IN GENESIS I-XI

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CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING THE MYTH

I. The Two Traditional Definitions Used in Biblical Science

Much of the misunderstanding concerning the use of the myth in modern Biblical scholarship has resulted from the failure to differentiate between two varying traditions of interpretation within the history of exegesis. These two main lines of interpretation can be characterized as the "broad" (or general) and the "narrow" (or specific) definition of the myth. Naturally there are many shades of variation within these two chief categories, but the fundamental distinction remains of basic importance for a clear understanding of the problem.

A. It has been the service of Hartlich-Sachs[1] to have pointed out in a thorough study the historical background of the broad or general definition of the myth. The term myth received its first precise formulation from the classical philologist C. G. Heyne who defined the myth as a necessary and universal form of expression within the early stage of man's intellectual development, in which unexplainable events were attributed to the direct intervention of the gods.[2] This concept of the myth was then shortly applied to the Old Testament by the so-called "mythische Schule" (Eichhorn, Gabler, Baur), and finally to the New Testament by D. F. Strauss. In contemporary scholarship this definition has been represented by R. Bultmann.[3] A clear statement of this general definition of the myth is offered by Hartlich-Sachs:

> "Die mythische Bewegung ordnet grundsaetzlich alle Aussagen ueber wunderbare und uebersinnliche Begebenheiten, vor allem ueber ein wunderhaftes unmittelbares Eingreifen und In-Erscheinung-Treten der Gottheit sowie anderer uebersinnlicher Wesen einander gleich und kennzeichnet sie einheitlich als ‚mythisch', sofern die Aussagen ueber solche Geschehnisse einer vor-wissenschaftlichen,unkritisch-naiven Bewusstseinsstufe entspringen: moegen sich solche Aussagen nun in der Bibel oder anderen Religionsdokumenten finden."[4]

B. Over against this broad definition of myth there has also developed a narrower one. This concept of the myth stems originally from the work of the Grimm brothers who in the "Anmerkungen" to their Kinder und Haus-Maerchen (Vol. 3, 1822) defined the myth as a literary form concerning stories of gods which was to be differentiated from other literary types such as the legend or the fairy tale. The analysis of the historical development among these literary types offered by Grimm was later to be corrected by Wundt,[5] but his definition remained basic. This narrow definition of the myth which in turn entered Biblical research is summarized by Gunkel:[6] "Mythen... sind Goettergeschichten, im Unterschiede von den Sagen, deren handelnde Personen Menschen sind." It is the myth in its narrow sense of the term as a "Gattung" which will concern us in our study.

II. The Character of the Myth in its Narrow Sense

A. The Formation[7]

The myth stems from a conception of the world which differs basically in decisive points from that of the modern. Whereas the critical mind conceives of the world as passive and impersonal, the primitive man sees his surroundings as consisting of active, living forces possessing a power which can be exerted over all the areas affecting his life. The working of these powers about him are felt in all the manifold impressions of nature which force themselves in overwhelming vividness directly upon him. This immediate contact with nature in birth and death, in growth and decay, in the rising and setting of the sun becomes the material out of which the myth is formed. To these impressions from nature as material for the myth must then also be included the whole mass of psychological stimuli[8] rising from the human subconsciousness such as dreams, halucinations, etc. which for the

primitive man possess the same objectivity as the world about him. The moment then of being seized from an impression (Ergriffenheit) is the first presupposition for the formation of the myth.

To this material there must be added the additional element of its apperception.[9] It is the creative force of the mythical mind which gives to this raw material a form. The elementary forces (Trieb) deep in the sub-consciousness of man such as fear, hope, desire, etc. receive and mould the chaotic impressions of nature into a unified pattern. The essential character of myth is that this formation of material finds expression in terms of personal beings, that is, from the complex union of impression and apperception emerges a principle of order which is projected into the plane of "Goettergeschichten".[10]

B. The Essence of the Myth

The mythical mind never accepts the order of the world as a normal state of affairs, but envisages it always as the result of an event through which activity it received its structure. It is essential for the myth that in order to understand the present order of the world it projects this condition of being back to an event in the "Urzeit" as a result of which the present world-order came into existence.[11] Since, however, the continual fluctuation of nature is characteristic of the world-order, this movement is also understood in relation to an event in the "Urzeit". But the event through which the present world-order was established can not be something static as seen by the constant fluctuation in the world of being. It must be continually renewed and set into motion. This is then one of the functions of the cult.[12] Through re-enacting the initial event it becomes present and its primeval power is renewed so as to re-establish and maintain the world-order. This

relationship can be illustrated e. g. in the myth of Tammuz. His death and resurrection in the "Urzeit" established that world-order in which the earth dies in the autumn and reawakens in the spring. This mythical "reality" must be continually re-enacted in the cult to assure each year the maintaining of this world-order which had once been established in the "Urzeit".

C. The Application of this Definition for our Study

We intend to use this narrow definition as the basis of our investigation of the myth in the Old Testament. However, in order to leave the possibility open that the myth might well appear in the Old Testament in other than just the pure form when measured by our definition, we shall include as mythical any idea, phrase, or word which gives evidence that its original setting belonged to a "Goettergeschichte". The characteristic evidence of such a word is its reflection of an independent vitality possessed originally by a supernatural being.

CHAPTER II. AN EXEGESIS OF GENESIS 1, 1-2, 4a

I. Evidences of Mythical Material in Gen. 1, 1-2, 4a (P)

A. The Primeval State of the World, vv. 1-2

The first problem with which we are faced is the syntactical relationship of vv. 1-3. Two chief opinions are represented. The first (Wellhausen, Gunkel, Procksch, von Rad), reading בְּרֵאשִׁית as a status absolutus, understands v. 1 as a complete sentence: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." The second (Rashi, Dillmann, Holzinger, Skinner, Budde) treats בְּרֵאשִׁית as a status const. followed by a clause as genitive. As a temporal clause v. 1 is subordinated then to v. 3 (seldom to 2) so that v. 1 becomes the protasis, v. 2 the parenthesis, and v. 3 the apodosis: "In the beginning of God's creating the heavens and the earth" or "when God began to create..-now the earth was..-then God said..".

In regard to the first opinion, one would expect the pointing בְּרֵאשִׁית (so occasionally βαρησηθ) but similar constructions to בְּרֵאשִׁית used as an absolute are frequent.[1] Skinner[2] objects that this construction is opposed to the essentially relative idea of the waw at the beginning of v. 2, but his point is not decisive. When the verse is understood as a superscription to what follows, it is grammatically free from objection.

A chief argument for regarding בְּרֵאשִׁית as a status const. is its parallel construction in Gen. 2, 4bff. (cf. 5, 1) where v. 4b is obviously a protasis followed by a parenthesis. Moreover, nearly all Accadian cosmogonies begin with the construction inûmi, later enûma, literally "in the day that" or "when". The concluding clause is not introduced by a special conjunction, but must be worked out from the sequence of ideas.[3] Procksch[4] objects to this construction

of v. 1 claiming that the meaning of שָׁמַיִם and אֶרֶץ is not clear. In v. 1 שָׁמַיִם and אֶרֶץ together form the cosmos (or chaos) while in v. 2 אֶרֶץ alone forms the chaos. Budde's[5] reply that the אֶרֶץ in v. 2 is the same as v. 1 before the creation of the heaven is not entirely satisfactory since the אֶרֶץ in v. 1 is not just something which is left over following the creation of heaven, but the result of the creative activity on the third day. The attempt of Wellhausen to avoid the contradiction between vv. 1 and 2 by seeing v. 1 the creation of the chaos must be rejected as being a contradiction in itself.

The essence of the difficulty is that in v. 2 a chaotic condition is presupposed which preceeds and is independent of the creative activity of God (v. 1). Since such a dualism is basically opposed to the Hebrew thought, we can only conclude that a foreign element has entered into the Hebrew tradition at this point. We are confirmed in our investigation when we see that in the Sumerian, Babylonian, and Egyptian cosmogonies, it is a common conception that the primeval state of the world be described in terms of a chaos.[6] If we admit such a similarity in content, it would also seem reasonable to recognize an influence in literary style. We prefer, therefore, the reading of בְּרֵאשִׁית as a <u>status const.</u> with v. 2 a parenthesis describing the chaotic condition of the primeval world, leaving open the possibility, however, for later discussion that this verse might contain a conscious effort against the older mythical framework.

Now that we have established the fact of a mythical framework used in describing the primeval state, let us investigate the content of the chaos. V. 2 divides itself into three sections. V. 2a וְהָאָרֶץ הָיְתָה תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ ! The verb הָיְתָה causes immediate difficulty since in a nominal clause, the

verb is superfluous. What we have, however, is a nominal clause of circumstantial force ("hal" clause by Arabic grammars. G-K. 141i). The verb הָיְתָה is used to locate the circumstance or condition in its proper sphere of time: "the earth having been chaos"[7]. תֹּהוּ is derived from *תָּהָה (ug. thw) not from תָּהוֹם.[8] It signifies a trackless, howling wilderness, parallel to מִדְבָּר and יְשִׁימוֹן. (Deut. 32. 10). It is used to describe a ruined city (Is. 24, 10), and is parallel to אָיִן and אֶפֶס (Is. 40, 17). It appears in a figurative sense of that which is unreal, of idols (Is. 41, 29), and worthless arguments (Is. 29-21) etc. It can be readily seen that with the concrete meaning of trackless desert, תֹּהוּ could become the symbol for emptiness. The root of בֹּהוּ is uncertain, but the word is used only in connection with תֹּהוּ. Perhaps the word is to be connected with the Arabic بهى "to be empty" and matched to the form תֹּהוּ as often occurs in pairs of words. Some would see a possible connection with the Phoenician βααν, the wife of the wind κολπία and the primeval mother of the world (Gunkel, Procksch). Whether there existed a connection originally is impossible to determine. תֹּהוּ seems to be a many sided בֹּהוּ, and therefore their normal use together. בֹּהוּ gives no evidence of having possessed a personal character.[9] We can for the present conclude that, although the expression lies within the mythical framework of the primeval state, in itself it evidences only a primitive way of thinking. Nothingness is described in concrete terms.

V. 2b וְחֹשֶׁךְ עַל-פְּנֵי תְהוֹם. תְּהוֹם (Ug. thm, Accadian ti' amtu) The word always appears without an article in the singular and is feminine in gender (cf. Gen. 49, 24; Is. 51, 10). It signifies as here the primeval

water of the chaos (Ps. 104, 6); then again the ocean, including the "Weltmeer" which in the concept of the Near East surrounded the world (Jonah 2, 6; Gen. 8, 2). Lastly, it can signify simply a body of water or flood (Ps. 42, 8).

Ever since the exhaustive analysis of Hermann Gunkel, Schoepfung und Chaos (1895), a connection between t^{e}hom and the Babylonian monster Tiamat, the feminine personification of primeval water, has been taken for granted by Old Testament scholarship.[10] Gunkel's arguments can be quickly summed up: a description of chaos in terms of water could not be indigenous to the tradition of arid Palestine, but points to the climate of the Fertile Crescent. In the epic of the Enuma elish we have the Babylonian myth of creation described in terms of a combat between Marduk and Tiamat, the sea monster. Following the victory of Marduk, the split body of Tiamat was used for the creation of the heavens and the earth. First Gunkel examines various references to the creation tradition outside of Gen. 1 (Is. 51, 9f; Ps. 89, 10f; Ps. 74, 12-19 etc.) and finds traditions which speak of Yahweh's fight with a mythical monster, his subsequent victory and the creation of the world. Turning then to Gen. 1, Gunkel finds evidence of the same pattern, although in a later form.

To summarize then: the undetermined form of t^{e}hom points to its original use as a proper name. Moreover, the description of chaos in terms of water evidences its mythical background. Finally, its connection with darkness חֹשֶׁךְ in 2b which is also not part of the creation but of the pre-existant chaos, strengthens the conclusion.[11] We shall leave for later discussion the problem of whether Gunkel's contention for an exclusive Babylonian source for the "dragon" tradition is justifiable.

2c וְרוּחַ אֱלֹהִים מְרַחֶפֶת עַל-פְּנֵי הַמָּיִם 12

This passage has long been the source of controversy. The problem lies in determining the meaning of רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים and מְרַחֶפֶת and whether this action is negative or positive, that is, whether 2c belongs to the description of chaos or is the beginning of the creation. רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים The word רוּחַ signifies, first of all, simply breath (Ez. 37, 5-8); then again, it means wind or breeze, the movement of the air (Gen. 3, 8; 8, 1). When the רוּחַ יהוה or רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים is spoken of, the usual meaning is of a supernatural, divine power which breaks into human life causing actions which surpass the normal human capacity. It is a divine, mysterious force from which all life is dependent. So Saul falls into ecstasy when the רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים comes upon him (1Sam. 10, 10) or Balaam receives the gift of prophesy from the רוּחַ א" (Num. 24. 2).

Gunkel, while admitting this ordinary use of רוּחַ א" finds another meaning in v. 2 which he classes as a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον : "die רוּחַ ... als die lebengebende, gestaltende goettliche Macht, die im Uranfang ueber den gestalt-und leblosen "Wassern" schwebt."[13] A similar idea is found in the Phoenician cosmogony with the spirit (ἀὴρ σοφώδης καὶ πνευματώδης) present before the actual creation. Closely allied with Gunkel's interpretation of רוּחַ is his translation of מְרַחֶפֶת as "brooding", so that "die uralte und weitverbreitete Spekulation vom Weltei nachklingt".[14]

The difficulty of Gunkel's interpretation is that it presupposes a unique occurrence in v. 2. This makes it almost impossible to check its validity from other texts or to bring it out of the realm of an interesting hypothesis. It does seem, however, strange that if the writer were attempting to put across a

unique meaning for רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים , he did not take more pains to assure its being properly understood. In its present syntactical position, it forms the third part of the description of the chaos. Galling[15] has rightly pointed out that if the priestly writer were trying to bring out something new, and especially a positive action, one would have expected a different construction, such as "וַתִּרְחַף רוּחַ א .

Another interpretation has been often suggested which depends especially on a reinterpretation of "רוּחַ א and מְרַחֶפֶת. According to this view the verse should be translated: "a tempestuous wind raging over the surface of the waters."[16] However, the controversy as to whether this is a positive or negative, that is, whether belonging to the chaos or creation, finds its defenders on both sides once again.

This view has been defended most recently by Galling, based on the theory of J. Powis Smith,[17] that in the expression רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים , אֱלֹהִים is used as a superlative. He has also brought grammatical evidence to show that such a use is possible. The question, however, must be raised whether this is a likely interpretation for v. 2. In the many occurrences of רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים no single instance in the rest of the O. T. can be brought to bear where this interpretation is warranted.

Then again, it has been urged that the rendering of מְרַחֶפֶת as "brooding" is false.[18] The philological evidence is as follows: The Hebrew root of רחף is uncertain. The root fails in Accadian and Ethiopic. In Arabic an infrequent verb occurs, but with the meaning "to be soft". Only in Syriac is the connection with the Hebrew clear where the root signifies to "foster", "cherish", "hover", "brood". In the O. T. the word appears once in its qal

form (Jer. 23. 9), and once in the piel (Deut. 32, 11) outside of Gen. 1, 2 which is also piel. The description in Deut. 32, 11 is that of an eagle teaching her young to fly. The first verb, hiph. of עור "stir up", denotes the action of the bird forcing the young out of the nest. Then follows יַרַחֵף describing the actual process of getting the young to take to the air. This action is a hovering, shaking, flapping, but never brooding. In Jer. 23, 9 רָחֲפוּ denotes a shaking or trembling of bones from fear.

In the light of this evidence מְרַחֶפֶת in v. 2 would best be rendered by some verb as "hover", "flutter" or "flap". L. Koehler[19] renders מְרַחֶפֶת in Gen. 1, 2 as "hover trembling". The philological evidence, in my opinion, would eliminate "brood" as a possibility. In the word "hover" we have excluded the idea of incubation which is foreign to the verb. With this new meaning of מְרַחֶפֶת, it seems to me also that much of the validity of Gunkel's interpretation is destroyed.

When we attempt to summarize the evidence, we find that the view which would see 2c as a creative activity is faced with the difficulty of its close syntactical connection within the chaos framework. The view which would see 2c as part of the chaotic description finds difficulty in doing justice to the רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים which has a positive meaning. We can only conclude that this difficulty in the text has been brought about due to a long process in which a tradition, foreign to Israel's thinking, has been partially absorbed. The idea of an active chaos independent of God's creating activity as we see in v. 2 is obviously mythical. The actual description, however, of this chaos has been so worked over that little mythical is left. What we have are only the scars of this long battle within the tradition of Israel.

B. The Word as the Creative Force, vv.3ff.

It is characteristic of the priestly account that the creation follows from the command of the word (vv. 3. 6. 9. 14. 20. 24. 26). That this is not a unique idea in Hebrew thought, has long been pointed out by scholars of comparative religion. In the earliest stages of primitive religion the connection was already made between word and event. The magical word was substantial in character, loaded with force, which could not be rescinded. Preuss[19a] has pointed out, for example, in the creation myth of the Uitoto the connection between the magical word proceeding from the thought and the creation. (cf. also Hauer's discussion, p. 129ff.) In the Enuma elish Marduk demonstrates his power by destroying a piece of clothing through the word of his mouth. (p. 117 AOT^2; p. 66 AENT.) In Egypt the power of creation and preservation of the world is derived from the divine word. Especially in the Memphis theology with Ptah as the world creator is his mouth the actual organ of creation.[19b] This primitive idea of the word as material substance with power is evidenced throughout the whole O. T., often connected with the name giving (e. g. Gen. 32, 27;Is. 9, 7; 55, 19f.). Even in such a late passage as Sach. 5, 3f. the word as a curse goes forth to destroy the house of the evil doer "timber and stones".

While this background in comparative religion cannot be denied, it would be a mistake to seek here a simple parallel with Gen. 1. In the developed theology of the Priestly writer, we are far removed from the realm of magic. Rather using this form of the word, he witnesses to the transcendence of God's creative activity. Only through his word does the creator come in contact with his creation. As we will discuss later, this form of the creation has reworked an older, more anthropomorphic one where the connection is not just through

the word. Over against the automatic functioning of the magical word, the Genesis account shows the directive activity of the word leading up to the finished work of the Sabbath. We can well admit a mythological framework, but the content and use here has long since lost this flavor.[19c]

C. "Mother-Earth" in the Creation, v. 11 and v. 24

It is significant that in the form of commands, the style changes in two of the creation activities, namely in vv. 11 and 24. The earth is here directly addressed and commanded to bring forth grass (v. 11) and living creatures (v. 24). Dillmann already pointed out: "Gott sagt nicht: es sprosse auf die Erde! sondern: die Erde lasse sprossen!" (p. 25) The concept behind this command is obviously that the earth has a power in itself of fertility. The priestly writer has carefully placed this older concept into his supernaturalistic framework, but the discrepancy even in the style points to an early tradition which has been assimilated only partially. Gunkel is quite correct in seeing in these verses an evidence of the ancient "mother-earth" mythology shared by so many religions.[20]

D. The Creation of the Heavenly Luminaries, vv. 14-19

It has long been pointed out by commentators that the text in these verses is not completely in order. (Holzinger, Skinner, Procksch). VV. 14 and 17 give different reasons for the creation of the מאורת. The repetition of מאורת in v. 14 and v. 15a is clumsy. Moreover, the function ascribed to the luminaries in v. 14 is difficult to explain in light of vv. 3-5 where the division between the day and the night has already been made.

It seems to me that the difficulty of the text has resulted from a later redaction by someone confused over the separation of the creation of light in vv. 3-5 from that of the heavenly luminaries in vv. 14-19. Otherwise it is

difficult to explain the awkward style and repetition of the present text. V. 15 begins the confusion. While v. 14 has given the function to the luminaries to serve as אֹתֹת and מוֹעֲדִים, v. 15 brings forth another function, namely that of lighting the earth which we already have in vv. 3-5. I believe that we are forced with Humbert[21] to strike v. 15 and v. 17b. While other stylistic emendations could no doubt still be made, the original sense of the text has now been established enough for us to go on.

According to P the luminaries have been established a) to divide between day and night (v. 14b), b) to be for אֹתֹת and מוֹעֲדִים v. 14c), c) to rule הַיּוֹם וְהַלָּיְלָה the day and the night (v. 16). It is important to notice that they are not the source of the light. The fact of day and night has already been established. Already in vv. 3f the light has been created independently of the luminaries. This idea is common in primitive thinking[21a] where the light is thought of as a material substance which exists in its own right. The function of the luminaries is rather to determine the borders and extent of day and night, and to mark their limits in time. We come now to the words אֹתֹת and מוֹעֲדִים. The purpose of the sign אֹת in the creation account is to assure the progression of time within the creation. "Durch die Institution der Gestirne ist ueberhaupt die Zeit als Bestandteil der Schoepfung erst geschaffen worden."[22] The luminaries serve as witnesses and signposts to the perpetuity of the creation. In a like manner the מוֹעֲדִים set also time limits, however, in the restricted and specific sense of the festival calendar.

When we compare this use of sign by P with that of the Babylonian, we are aware of the striking difference.[23] We read in the Enuma elish that following the creation of the world by Marduk "wurden die Offenbarungszeichen

festgesetzt, die Zeichnungen gemacht. Einen Standort am Himmel und auf Erden bestimmte er.."[24] These luminaries serve as one of the chief means of revelation. The fate of the world determined by the gods is mirrored in the movement of the heavens. They become omens to the events of the world, but not as in Hebrew a marking of God's creation in time. In the cyclic thinking of the astral mythology, time has no particular significance. Only when a Heilsgeschichte is established can the marking of a progression achieve importance.

We now turn to the last function of the luminaries: "to rule over (ממשלת) the day and the night. Gunkel has found here an evidence of an older mythological function (p. 108). Certainly the word "rule" as applied to the luminaries reminds one of the astral teaching of Babylon. While the stars were not directly identified with the gods in the theology, they represented the primary manifestation of revelation. In the sense that the stars mirrored the will of the gods in determining the fate of the world, they were said to rule. Moreover, as is so often the case in religious practice, the theoretical distinctions of the theology were confused by the populus who conceived of the stars themselves as possessing the actual power.

To the interpretation of Gunkel, Keller[25] feels that it is "kaum wahrscheinlich", and points to the prohibition in Jer. 10, 2 and the energetic battle of 2 Isaiah against astrology (47, 13). But this is hardly evidence enough to settle the problem. We have already seen how the priestly tradition has preserved the vocabulary to render it harmless. This same endeavor seems evident in the choice of words for the luminaries: מאורת "lights". This choice of a neutral word, as well as the position of their creation on the fourth

day with the specific function of regulating time, would invalidate any astrological teaching. However, in the word "rule", we have very definitely an evidence of an older mythical tradition. A verse such as Judges 5,20 indicates that older mythical traditions in regard to the luminaries were present in Israel. Why P chose to retain it, is impossible to say. We can only be sure that the word in the Genesis form has lost its mythical meaning.

E. The Sea Monster, v.21

On the fifth day of creation a distinction is made between the "great sea-monsters" הַתַּנִּינִם הַגְּדֹלִים and the remaining creatures of the water. Since it is characteristic of the priestly writer to make distinctions within a genus (cf. v. 11), this division might at first appear insignificant. However, a more careful investigation of the word תַּנִּין reveals that it is a being with very definite mythological character. In Is. 51,9 the tannin is set parallel to Rahab whom Yahweh destroyed in olden times. In Ps. 74,12 the tanninim are paralleled with Leviathan. Similarly in Is. 27,1 the "monster in the sea" (הַתַּנִּין אֲשֶׁר בַּיָּם) is mentioned together with Leviathan and the crooked serpent. This conclusion that tannin represents a mythological being is confirmed by its occurrence in the Ras Shamra texts as a mythical entity of the sea.[26] In Arabic the word ثعبان appears with the meaning "water hose" which would indicate the mythologizing of a phenomenon in nature.

In its present context tannin has lost all its mythical flavour. Just as the other creatures of the sea, it owes its existence to the creative activity of God. It is impossible to determine whether or not its specific singling out for mention was caused by an anti-mythical tendency at this point by P.

F. The Creation of Man, vv. 26-28[27]

Our first task is to determine the meaning of בְּצַלְמֵנוּ and כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ. The meaning of צֶלֶם is clearly that of statue, picture, form. It denotes a very concrete image and is used in describing the exterior form of an object.[28] דְּמוּת signifies also a very concrete image. It can best be translated resemblance or likeness. Humbert defines it: "demoût désigne une image concrète, mais moins précise, moins adéquate jusque dans tout les détails que selem.."(p. 161). Koehler correctly points out that the word serves "zur Abschwaechung einer Gleichheit"(p. 21) as in Ez. 1, 5b "likeness of an man", or Ez. 1, 26 "likeness of a throne". Now it is important to note that this same expression "in our image, after our likeness" occurs in Gen. 5, 3, however, with the prepositions interchanged. This would indicate that no more than the idea of similitude is expressed by בְּ and כְּ (so LXX κατά).

What are we now to understand by the plural forms: "Let us make".. "our image, our likeness"? Koehler explains its occurrence as a form of colloquial speech, just as one would say: "let us go", to avoid using the singular pronoun. "Somit waere in Gen. 1, 26 das 'wir' aus keinem anderen Grunde gebraucht als aus der Absicht, ein verfruehtes 'ich' zu vermeiden" (p. 22). While it is true that the plural form would be less anthropomorphic than the singular, and would avoid too close a connection with God's own form, Koehler's explanation is hardly convincing. Gunkel rightly points to a more obvious meaning. God turns to the other beings and includes them in his "we" (p. 111). The idea that God had a court in analogy to the earthly monarchs is often evidenced in the O. T. (cf. Ps. 82, 2. 6f; 58, 2; 1 Ki. 22, 19ff;

Job 1, 6ff, Is. 6, 1ff. cf. the exegesis of Gen. 6, 1-4 for a discussion of the bene elohim.) In the O. T. the elohim are always seen as subordinates to Yahweh. But the idea of a court originally stems from the idea of the theogony with the younger generation along side of the older, ruling gods.

We return now to the meaning of our text. Man is created with the concrete form of the  . He is not created in the image of Yahweh, but rather like the image of the elohim. Moreover, it is difficult to say exactly what this image is. From Gen. 5, 3 we know that it is passed down from father to son. Koehler suggests that the image lies in the "aufrechte Gestalt" of man. I find nothing in the text which would point conclusively to this solution.

What can we determine as mythical material in the text? We have seen that the stress of v. 26 is placed on a likeness in the concrete form and not in terms of "personality". Certainly the idea that man possesses the external image of divine beings is mythical. Similar parallels from Babylonian mythology have been referred to especially by Hehn. In the Gilgamesh Epic Aruru, before commencing with the creation of Enkidu, forms a mental image (zikru) or double of Anu.[29] Similarly in the "Descent of Ishtar to the Nether World", Ea conceives an image before creating Asushunamir.[30] It must, however, be said that the idea that man is created as a little piece of divinity is not represented in our text. This type of mythical thinking, which was common in the Near East, has found no inroads in the Biblical tradition. Finally, the idea of a heavenly court of elohim represents a mythical idea. In spite of the fact that a clear monotheism is represented by the priestly writer, the framework is mythical.

G. The Primeval Peace, vv. 29-30

In vv. 29-30 the fruit of plants is given for the nourishment of both man and the other living creatures. It is to be expected from the priestly writer that he exhibit an interest in the divine commandments concerning food. But the full significance of this order in vv. 29-30 is only obtained when one reviews the historical perspective of P. For the first time in Gen. 9, 3 permission is given to man for the eating of flesh. That is, only after the divine order is established following the corruption of the old (6, 11) and its destruction in the flood, can flesh be eaten. The order established in vv. 29-30 implies a complete peaceful relationship between all living creatures. We have, therefore, in P a very definite allusion to the "paradise myth".

It takes little searching in the history of religion to find abundant proof that this motif of primeval peace is common in mythology. In the Sumerian "paradise myth" of Dilmun we have a description of the "Urzeit":

> "The lion kills not
> The wolf snatches not the lamb
> Unknown is the kid devouring wild dog.."[31]

Similarly, a golden age of peace and abundance without fear is described in Indian mythology.[32] Then again in Vergil's 4 Eclogue we have the classical presentation of this thought: "Nicht mehr fuerchten den Loewen der Rinder weidende Herden."[33] Finally in the Jewish rabbinical literature we have a fanciful reworking of this mythical motif.[34]

II. The Nature and Origin of the Mythical Material

A. We have seen in our exegesis that the priestly writer in Gen. 1 has been dependent upon older mythical tradition. We shall now attempt to go one step further and turn our attention to this tradition lying behind the

creation story. The first question to be answered is whether this tradition was an oral or literary one. Now we must be sure that the question is correctly formulated. We are not asking whether the writer of Gen. 1 was dependent upon an oral or a literary source. But our concern is to determine whether the mythical material which is reflected in Gen. 1 shows evidence of being transmitted in a literary or oral tradition. We believe, furthermore, that the principle adopted by H. Gunkel is sound, namely that if a tradition shows a tremendous variation within the O. T., this can only be explained by postulating an oral tradition. Of the mythical material found in Gen. 1 only three traditions occur frequently enough in the O. T. to afford a basis of comparison: a) primeval state e) sea monster g) primeval peace. We believe that evidence enough has been given of a varied tradition to warrant our conclusion that these traditions were oral in character.

B. We now turn to our second question as to whether this mythical material, a good part of which we have traced to an oral transmission, gives evidence of having stemmed from one or many traditions. An internal criterion for accepting different traditions would be the presence of discrepancies within the material itself, however, always reckoning with the possibility that a tradition might contain friction within itself. What can we say about our material? Gunkel (p. 114) and Skinner believe that a discrepancy exists between v. 28 and v. 29. They see two traditions joined here: 1) a creation tradition, climaxing in man's dominion over the animals, 2) a fragment from a tradition of primeval peace. Budde (p. 84), on the other hand, finds no discrepancy: "aber heisst denn Herrschen so viel wie Auffressen?" Nevertheless Gunkel is probably right in seeing that the limitation imposed in v. 29

hardly suits to the general rule הָרָה of v. 28. This discrepancy is, however, not to be conceived of on the level of literary criticism, but goes back to the oral tradition.

Then again, one might find within the chaos description signs of varying traditions. In v. 2, 2b and 2c picture the chaos in terms of primeval water. What is the case with 2a תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ ? We have seen that the original idea is of a trackless wilderness which became the symbol of emptiness or nothingness. Its use in Jer. 4, 23 points also to its meaning as chaos, pictured as a wilderness. Moreover, in Is. 34, 11 where the phrase again occurs in a description of Edom's doom, the picture is of a chaos caused, however, by fire and brimstone (v. 9) with eternal smoke. The evidence, therefore, seems strong that the chaos description in v. 2a stems from a different tradition than that of 2b and c. Finally, it must be reckoned with that in the process of assimilation and reworking by the priestly school, discrepancies within the mythical tradition were removed.

Admitting now the probability that more than one oral tradition was present, let us attempt to determine whether any connection existed among our mythical material in the oral traditions. Here the internal evidence is scanty. From passages such as Ps. 89, 10f we can determine a connection in oral tradition between a dragon fight and the creation of heaven and earth. Also Jer. 4, 23f confirms a tradition in which darkness belongs to the picture of chaos. In Ps. 104 we have evidence of a dependency on the same tradition as Gen. 1, although there is no series of creative acts present. In vv. 6ff an echo of the battle with the sea is found with Yahweh as a warrior screaming a cry against the sea, which is pictured as covering the earth. V. 2 describes

Yahweh covered with light as a garment which is well a poetic portrayal of the connection of Yahweh with the creation of light.

We are, however, forced to admit that the internal evidence within the O. T. gives us little knowledge of the nature of the oral tradition in regard to number or character of the "Vorlage".

C. We now turn our attention to the question of the origin of these mythical traditions. Reasons enough have already been given to warrant our investigation of the creation accounts of other cultures which might be the source of the mythical material.

1. The Creation Tradition of Babylon[35]

Since the chief source of our knowledge of the Babylonian tradition is the epic of Enuma elish we shall start by a comparison with Gen. 1. We can determine the following points of contact:

a) Both the Enuma elish and Gen. 1 have a description of chaos as an uncreated mass before the beginning of the creation. Both the accounts agree in the nature of this chaos as being the primeval water. The Babylonian has the primeval water personified in male and female, Apsu and Tiamat. The Hebrew has but the tehom, however, its form indicates a nomen proprium.

b) Both accounts agree that the creation of the world was achieved by the dividing of the primeval waters. In the Babylonian account Marduk divides Tiamat, the primeval water, and with one half forms the sky, with the other half the earth. In the Hebrew account the firmament (רָקִיעַ) divides the primeval waters into that part above the heavens, and that part below.

c) Both accounts agree to the existence of light and to the alternation of day and night as being before the creation of the luminaries, cf. Enuma elish, Tab. I, Lines 49-50.

d) Both accounts agree that the creation of man follows the creation of the world. In both accounts is the decision for man's creation made in an assembly of divine beings.

e) Both accounts agree that following the creation, there is rest. In the Babylonian account the gods build Marduk a temple "a chamber for our nightly rest," (VI, line 52) which is followed by a celebration. In the Hebrew, God rests and establishes the Sabbath.

*f) In the Berossus account, there is further agreement with the Hebrew that darkness was part of the chaotic state. (σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ). The points of disagreement are as follows:

a) In the Babylonian chaos there is no equivalent for רוח אלהים or the moving of the divine spirit over the waters.

b) The order of creation between accounts differ. In the Babylonian account the luminaries follow the creating of the heaven. The exact order of the Babylonian creation, however, is not known, probably having been related in the lost portion of Table V.

c) The decision for the creation of man is formulated by the Hebrew account in the plural, in the Enuma elish in the singular. (Table VI, lines 5f) However, the plural with the situation of a celestial council is found in the Assyrian cosmogony (AOT^2 131f.)

There can be little doubt in light of this comparison that a very definite relationship exists between the mythical material in Gen. 1 and the

Babylonian creation epic. Furthermore, this relationship cannot be explained with the theory that both traditions go back to a common source. When we compare the Sumerian creation[36] tradition which formed, undoubtedly, the basis for the Babylonian with Gen. 1, it is immediately evident that the Genesis tradition is dependent on the Babylonian tradition and not on a common one. This should not be thought of, however, as a literary dependence on the Enuma elish,, but rather a borrowing from the same tradition.

2. The Creation Tradition of Phoenicia[37]

a) We turn now to the creation tradition of Phoenicia to see whether also here a point of possible contact can be discovered. We are in a much more difficult position in this investigation due to the lack of proper source material. In the Phoenician cosmology according to Philo from Byblos the following points of contact deserve mentioning: At the beginning of all things was a dark and windy air (ἀέρα ζοφώδη καὶ πνευματώδη) or a breath of dark air (πνοὴν ἀέρος ζοφώδους) and a dirty, dark chaos (χάος θολερόν, ἐρεβῶδες). Through their union, named Πόθος , came into existence Μώτ , the primeval mud. She contained the seeds of the creation from which all things sprung. First of all there appeared certain "watchers of heaven" (οὐρανοῦ κατόπται). Μώτ took on the form of an egg and shone forth as did also the heavenly luminaries. More striking is the creation account of Mochus. The union of Αἰθήρ and Ἀήρ produced Οὐλωμός, from which proceeded Χουσωρός, "the first opener" and then an egg. Later it is explained that the egg is the heaven and that when it is split in two, the one half forms the heaven and the other the earth.

Points of contact with the Biblical account are much more difficult to determine. There is a primeval chaos described, part of which consisted of a primeval wind. Gunkel sees here a contact with Gen. 1, 2c, the רוח over the waters. (p. 104) Moreover, many commentators have seen in the idea of a world-egg a possible parallel to v. 2c. We have attempted to show in our exegesis that this interpretation collapses with the proper translation of מרחפת.

b) There have been various attempts to find in the Ras Shamra texts allusions to the creation myth of Gen. 1. Chiefly this connection has been sought in reference to a "dragon-fight" which has been associated with the Tiamat tradition.[38] The chief difficulty of this assumption lies in the fact that in no passage does the dragon fight myth have any connection with creation. It is easily understandable, however, that this false implication has been drawn when one considers that many of the passages which we now see have a very definite connection to Canaanite mythology such as Is. 27, 1, were placed by Gunkel Schoepfung und Chaos in the framework of the Tiamat myth. We are now aware that the dragon myth in the O. T. cannot simply be derived from one source. Rather, each passage must be examined in itself to determine its source. There is now rather general agreement that there is no point of contact between the mythical material of Gen. 1 and that of Ras Shamra.[39]

3) The Creation Tradition in Egypt

The Egyptian myths of creation begin also with a chaos, surrounded by darkness, conceived of as the primeval water Nun. It was from this chaos that the world protruded at the beginning as an island to form the primeval hill (Urhuegel). Nun was first conceived of as the primeval material

(Urstoff) before the creation, but soon it was personified into a god. In the doctrine of Heliopolis, the sun-god Re sprang forth to beget from himself the four pairs of gods which formed with himself the nine in the godhead. Over against this doctrine of Heliopolis, there was developed in Hermopolis in the prehistorical time another theory.[39a] They postulated that from out of the chaos arose first the 8 gods who then produced the sun. Among these gods it was Amun ("the Invisible" Air, Wind) who played the significant role. He created through his life-giving breath the world from the chaos. On the basis of Sethe's research in regard to this theology of Hermopolis, Ed. Meyer[39b] has attempted to find in this doctrine, the original creation tradition which influenced not only the Phoenician cosmogony but also the Israelite. It is this idea of the life-giving breath that he finds reflected in the ruah of Gen. 1, 2. Moreover, he points out that the idea of the world as a primeval egg is also Egyptian. But as we have seen this is not represented in the Hebrew tradition.

We can now summarize the conclusions of our investigation of the origin of the mythical traditions in Gen. 1. The evidence appears decisive that the material found in the Babylonian epic forms the chief source for the oral tradition found in the "Vorlage" of Gen. 1. The influence of the Phoenician-Canaanite or Egyptian cosmogony seems very small.

III. The Time and Nature of the Transmission of the Mythical Tradition into Israel.

We have concluded that the oral tradition in Gen. 1 is dependent to a large degree on mythical material from the Babylonian creation account. But when we consider the tremendous differences between the accounts, we are immediately forced to add that a direct influence is also excluded. Our

problem is now to examine this process of transmission from the stage of an oral tradition in Babylon to its literary fixation in Gen. 1.

A. It was the work chiefly of H. Gunkel which gave the death blow to the older theories concerning the age of the material used in Gen. 1. There were two views which Gunkel attacked: a) Wellhausen's view that Gen. 1 is the "freie Construction des Verfassers,"[40] b) Stade's view that "erst vom 8. Jahrhundert an laesst sich in Israel sicher und in erheblichem Umgange ein Eindringen babylonischer Vorstellungen beobachten."[41] Gunkel's arguments can be quickly summarized:[42] a) Gen. 1 possesses an old mythical "Vorlage", the present form of which can only be explained by supposing a long history of assimilation within Israel, b) many technical terms are contained in the chapter which indicate an old story, c) the idea of creation is very old in Israel, d) since the mythical material could not have been taken over by P or in the prophetic age due to their opposition, it must have entered the tradition of Israel in the age of the early kings.

Recently the view of Gunkel has been attacked by Mowinckel,[43] who defends the former view of Stade. While reiterating many of the arguments of Stade, his chief new argument is based on a source criticism of Gen. 1-11. He finds two sources, starting with the Kainite and Sethite genealogies, which he identifies with J and E. Since the J source shows no evidence of Babylonian matter, while E shows definite signs of borrowing, he concludes that the Babylonian matter entered into the Hebrew tradition in the time between J and E, or the Assyrian period of Israel's history. (p. 84) Now this theory of Mowinckel has been attacked by Albright[44] who defends the position of Gunkel.

Albright presents three chief arguments: a) The first is from analogy. In all cultures the elements of mythology and heroic saga are created and combined very early in their history. The patriarchal tradition reflects the conditions of the Middle Bronze Age. Now Gen. 1-11 contains only Mesopotamian and Hebrew elements, the latter of which cannot be understook as a creation of the Iron Age. It is reasonable to bracket these two elements in Gen. 1-11 as belonging to the same formative period of Hebrew folklore to which the stories of the Patriarchal Age must be attributed, namely in the 13 century B. C. b) If the Mesopotamian elements in Gen. 1-11 were borrowed in the late Assyrian age, it is strange that there is no trace of Canaanite dragon mythology which is so evidenced in the Hebrew literature of the 7-5 centuries. c) Much of the mythical material, e. g. the tower of Babel, presupposes a period when Babylon was in the height of her power. The story must have arisen between the 18-15 centuries. These arguments of Albright when coupled with those of Gunkel, are conclusive proof, in my opinion, that the mythical material is of very ancient origin.

Furthermore, the thesis of Albright[45] as to the transmission of this mythical material seems the most satisfactory at our present stage of knowledge. He believes that the "Amorites" and the Proto-Aramaens brought the oral traditions to the Upper Euphrates region during the period following 2000 B. C. when by 1750 the main cities from Syria to Babylon were ruled by Amorite dynasties. These traditions were then brought from Northern Mesopotamia by the Hebrew ancestors into Canaan before the middle of the second millennium. The Biblical tradition that the home of the patriarchs lay in the region of Harran in North Western Mesopotamia seems well confirmed by the

Mari texts. Moreover, the older view that the Babylonian traditions were mediated through the Canaanite culture seems less likely following the discovery at Ugarit.

B. We have reached that place in our investigation where we are faced with the question of the "Sitz-im-Leben" of Gen. 1. An answer to this question would be of great aid in determining how the mythical material was taken over and assimilated into the Israelite tradition. It is generally admitted that the material in Gen. 1 was transmitted and guarded by a priestly tradition. The language employed is sacerdotal and cultic in character.[46] In a recent article Humbert has attempted to show that in the word בָּרָא we have witness to a particular sacerdotal tradition of the creation, which he dates as pre-exilic.[47] But it remains an unexplained problem why a tradition, which we have shown to have existed in Israel from the beginning of its history, should have found so little echo in the pre-exilic literature. The attempts to see in Gen. 1 a reflection of the liturgy from the New Year's Festival remain very hypothetical.[48] We must conclude that our present knowledge is too limited to afford a more satisfactory answer to this problem.

C. A great many of the problems which are connected with the complicated process involved in the literary fixation of the oral tradition in Gen. 1 lie beyond the scope of our subject. However, it is necessary to touch lightly on a few which are involved in our problem. The fact has been noted by O. T. scholars for a long time that the present disposition of 6 days in Gen. 1 is constructed upon an earlier recension of 8 days.[49] Moreover, it was the service of Schwally to have pointed out especially clearly that the scheme of creation activities shows much discrepancy and friction internally.[50] We read for example in v. 14 that God commanded that there be lights in the firmament

and it was so. In v. 15, however, we are told that God made the two great lights. We can only account for these contradictions by postulating an earlier recension which has been reworked by the priestly writer. Budde's attempt to show that this early recension of P was J^2 has found little acceptance.[51]

The fact, however, that this earlier recension was literary in character, seems evident from a closer examination of the contradicting schemes in Gen. 1. The purpose of the priestly redactor[52] was to re-interpret the root ברא in the light of the supernaturalistic theology of the post-exilic period. We see, therefore, that v. 7: "God made the firmament and divided..." is preceeded by v. 6: "God said, let there be a firmament.. and let it divide.." The priestly writer did not attempt to discard v. 7, but merely reinterpreted it by the insertion of v. 6. This interweaving of verses could only have been carried out when there was a literary "Vorlage". The same scheme of reinterpretation by addition is evidenced throughout the creation account. Vv. 14-15 present creation of heaven as a fiat act over against vv. 16-17. V. 20 interprets fish and birds as a fiat act of creation over against v. 21. V. 24 over against v. 25. V. 27 would also appear to be a redaction to v. 26. However, an exact analysis of what belonged to this literary "Vorlage" and what to P would require a thorough investigation which lies beyond the scope of our topic.

Finally, all evidence points to the probability that it was the work of the priestly writer that the older literary recension was set into the new 6 day framework on the basis of the establishment of the Sabbath.[53] This reworking of the older material into a new framework presupposes also a literary recension, and points to the same time as the above mentioned reinter-

pretation. The failure to achieve a consistent scheme would point to the difficulty of fitting the older recension into its new mould. This redactory work of the priestly writer climaxes the long process by which the mythical material, first in oral tradition, and only later in a literary form, was transformed and polished into the form which we have in Gen. 1.

CHAPTER III. AN EXEGESIS OF GENESIS 2,4b-3,24

I. An Examination of the Sources

There has been general agreement among Old Testament scholars for over a century that these chapters belong to the source J. The problem, however, of various sources within the Yahwist was first presented clearly by K. Budde Die biblische Urgeschichte (1883). The presence of doublets and contradictions within the narrative provides the starting point for the criticism. The chief indications of a double account are as follows: 1) the primeval state of the world without rain (v. 5) is difficult to reconcile with the state of moisture caused by the 'ed (v. 6), 2) the planting of a garden occurs twice (vv. 8 and 9), 3) man is twice placed in the garden (vv. 8 and 15), 4) two trees are mentioned in 2,9, yet 3,3f knows only of one tree. For the first time again in 3,22 do we have two trees, appearing in reversed order; 5) the condemnation of man appears in a double form- a nomad's life in 3,18a over against a farmer's in 3,17c.d,19a, 6) there is a double expulsion from the garden 3,23 and 3,24, 7) a double guard to watch the garden 3,24.

In the light of the friction within the chapter Budde proposed one chief source having experienced a "Neubearbeitung und Umgestaltung"[1], which caused the unevenness and discrepancies. Gunkel went one step farther and presumed next to the chief source, Je, a "Nebenquelle" Jj which, however, was only existant in fragments.[2] Procksch follows Gunkel with minor changes. Both Smend[3] and Eissfeldt[4] try to unravel two complete sources. Meinhold[5] has even found traces of three literary sources.

While the work of literary criticism has been invaluable for our understanding, it has become increasingly evident that the discrepancies within the

chapter are not to be solved simply on the basis of the literary sources. Already Gunkel[6] suggested that two oral traditions formed the basis of the main source. One was of paradise and its loss, the other a kind of creation story. Gressmann then attempted to push the form-critical method further. In his first analysis of the fall[7] (3, 1f) he concludes that there are "drei Schichten uebereinander gelagert". The first one tells of the tree of the knowledge good and evil whose fruits afford an anti-godly magical knowledge. Secondly, a story of the tree of knowledge, whose fruits are of aphrodisiac nature destroying the childish innocence of Eve, and making her mother of all living things against the divine will. Thirdly, the tree of life whose fruits bring eternal life, reserved for the gods. Later[8] Gressmann finds an old motif which combines fertility with the tree of life, a motif of mother-earth, and a motif concerning itself with a battle between the sky-god and the god of the underworld. Then again, Staerk[8a] objected to the purely literary method of solving the difficulties in the "Urgeschichte". He sees in Gen. 2-3 not a mechanical joining of two sources by a redactor, but rather "eine zersungene Sage" which had assimilated varying traditions within itself. He stresses the necessity for seeing the story as an organism which has grown together. (p. 47). Hans Schmidt[9] attempted to overcome the difficulties in the chapter by supposing three oral traditions, 1) a creation story, 2) a paradise story, 3) a mother-earth motif.

The most careful attempt to combine the literary with the form-critical (traditionsgeschichtlich) method is offered by Begrich.[10] Taking his starting point from 3, 1-5, very much like Gunkel, he works out a chief and a secondary source.[11] Inside this chief source he recognizes discrepancies and aetiologies of creation which point to independent oral traditions. He then works out various

motifs within the chief literary source. Finally, P. Humbert[12] has attempted to solve the discrepancies on the basis of two traditions, a myth of paradise and one of creation which he believes the Yahwist has joined. While his analysis in many places is convincing, his attempt to do away with the necessity of literary criticism by reconciling the contradictions has less in its favor.[13]

The lack of agreement as to the problem of sources among scholars should warn us against any all too hasty solution. So much we can temporarily conclude: The passage has many internal difficulties which are not able to be resolved on the plane of a pure literary analysis. Following our investigation of the mythical motifs within the chapter, we shall return to this problem of sources.

II. Evidences of Mythical Material in Gen. 2, 4b-3, 24

A. The Primeval State, 2, 4b-6

These verses present a similar syntactical problem as 1, 1-3 with the exception that v. 4b cannot be construed to be a complete sentence. The suggestion of Wellhausen[14] that the verse is a fragment is unconvincing. When one takes 4b as a protasis, then it is most logical that v. 7 become the apodosis, with vv. 5 and 6 forming a parenthesis. The imperfect consecutive, which introduces the main clause, forms the natural connection and makes Skinner's suggestion (p. 54) that the apodosis begin at v. 5 most unlikely. Moreover, if v. 6 had formed the apodosis, then we would have expected וַיַּשְׁקְ. In v. 5 we have a verbal clause with the natural word order reversed in order to express a state (G-K 142a). V. 6 is also a similar verbal clause expressing a state. The imperfect, however, as over against the

particle (1, 2), expresses a progressive duration ("a mist went up continually" G-K 107b, d) Likewise, the perfect consecutive והשקה following the imperfect receives a meaning such as "ever watered afresh" (G-K 112e).

In vv. 5 and 6 we have described, therefore, the primeval state of the world before the creation. V. 5 brings a description of the chaos in negative terms, which follows closely the Near Eastern pattern.[14a] The earth lies in a state of "chaos" due to lack of rain. But the difficulty arises that v. 6 describes a simultaneous state which is diametrically opposed to that of absolute aridity. Whatever this אד may be, it produces a moisture which is continually saturating the surface of the earth. We have seen already (cf. footnote 13) that Humbert's attempt to eliminate the difficulty by seeing in the 'ed a preliminary stage to the creation of man is invalid, since here is not a new action, but a state within the framework of chaos. The attempt of Procksch (p. 20) to see here a restriction in mode (no rain, only an 'ed)cannot be defended since the writer has not subordinated the 'ed to the rain. Furthermore, a local restriction cannot be construed since it would be false to assume that only the steppe was without rain. E. Sachsse[15] has attempted to solve the difficulty by proposing that the negation אין (5b) be translated to include v. 6: "No one to work the ground nor to lift the 'canal water' from the ground." But this construction is grammatically impossible with the present position of 'ed in v. 6. Moreover, the textual emendation of Schultz[16] ואדן עלה has little to commend it.

This problem in syntax is made more difficult by our failure to understand the exact meaning of אד.[17] (LXX πηγή ; Aq. ἐπιβλυσμός ; V. fons) Its single other occurrence in Job 36, 27,[18] which is itself a corrupt

passage, leads one to think of "vapor" or "cloud". A vapor would, however, hardly saturate the surface of the ground. The Accadian edu would suggest "flood" or "high-water". H. Schmidt[19] would see in 'ed a proper name with mythological character- "Regenwolkenhimmel". Albright[20] connects the word with a river diety Id, the subterranean source of fresh water. A direct mythological derivation remains very uncertain. We can, however, conclude that here is an entity which existed before and was independent of the creation of Yahweh which maintains a positive sense.

Commentators have long attempted, on the literary level, a solution of the difficulty in these verses. Holzinger[21] strikes the entire v. 6. Budde[22] retains v. 6, but feels forced to remove v. 5b. Gunkel[23] finds evidence here for his two source theory, suggesting that v. 6 stems from a different source than v. 5. Certainly it would be understandable that in the combination of a paradise myth with a creation myth a discrepancy might arise. However, it remains to be considered, especially in the light of the analogy in 1, 2 whether this inconsistency existed already in the oral tradition. It would evidence a piece of partly digested tradition struggling within the borrowed framework of a primeval chaos.

B. The Creation of Man, v. 7

The Yahwist chooses the word יצר ("to form, as a potter"), which P later on avoided. He uses האדם as appellativum in the sense of a proper name so that Adam becomes a personification of the human race (G-K 126e). The roots of both אדם and אדמה are uncertain,[24] but they are used here in a popular etymology אדם-אדמה (homo-humus). Similar in Egypt, man (rmt) was created from the tear of the gods (rmjt).[25] The idea

is obviously that man comes from the soil and returns to it in death. ("Ackersmann" or better "Erdmann"). The mythical motif of mother-earth is reflected in the choice of material.

Yahweh then blows into the nose of man the נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים and he takes on life, becoming a נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה. We have in this word no idea of "immortality" (contr. Budde), but simply man partakes of the divine power of life which is carried in the breath. This idea of life being carried in the breath is a common phenomenon in the history of religion.[26] In Babylon Marduk is endowed with the life-giving breath. He is addressed as the "god of the good breath" (ili šāri tabi).[27] The same close connection between breath and life is evidenced by the prayer: "ich moege leben durch deinen Odem".[28] Especially, however, in Egypt is the idea widespread. So the king speaks to Amon: "Deine Farbe ist Licht, dein Atem ist Leben...dein Leib ist ein Windhauch in jeder Nase."[29] We can conclude that v. 7 shares the common Near Eastern mythical conception of life in the divine breath.

There have been numerous attempts, however, to see in the figure of Adam a mythological entity. Gressmann[30] believes that traces are evidenced that Adam has replaced an early mythological figure. His chief argument rests on a comparison of Gen. 2, 4bff. with Ez. 28, and he sees here a common tradition. While the two accounts have much in common, they also have tremendous differences. It is a mistake to conclude immediately on a direct sharing of common tradition at every point. This is exactly the question which must be investigated: how much of Gen. 2, 4bff. can be attributed to a mythical tradition, and how much stems from the creation of the Yahwist? In my opinion, there is little evidence in our text which would lead one to

conclude that Adam is only a survival from the mythical figure of Ez. 28. The whole point of Gen. 2-3 is concerned with Adam as a representative of the human race. L. Koehler[31] finds also in Adam traces of a "punische Erdgott", but his argument is closely related to the evaluation of Eve's position, and will be discussed in a following paragraph.

C. The Creation of the Animals and the Woman, vv. 18-25

The creation of the woman is very closely coupled to the creation of the animals. It is very doubtful, however, that these motifs were originally connected. The creation of the animals contains an ancient independent motif in itself, namely, the relation of the name to the thing. The present text shows a very clever coupling of older motifs, and its extreme naivete, namely, that the animals owe their existence to the failure of Yahweh to find a mate for Adam, witnesses to an ancient connection most probably in the oral tradition. The friction within the verses (v. 18 stands somewhat isolated) can best be explained in this way, rather than to assume an early tradition in which the animals resulted from Yahweh's inability to create a woman.[32]

Here we must be careful to distinguish sharply between mythical and fairy tale (Maerchen) motifs. The magical sleep, the rib from Adam's side--these are fairy tale motifs.[33] But there is a mythical aetiology into which these fairy tale motifs have been placed. To the question: Whence this mysterious power of attraction between the sexes? this myth gives an answer. Woman was made from man's flesh and their flesh strives for reunion. A similar myth by Plato (Symposium) explains the sexual union in that Zeus separated an original androgynic creature into male and female. Hempel has

advanced the thesis that the Yahwist saw in the creation of woman the first punishment.[34] This motif, common to the Pandora myth[34a] finds little support in the text. The peculiar role of the woman in the fall, however, will be discussed later.

D. The Garden of Eden, vv. 8-15[35]

"And Yahweh God planted a garden in Eden, in the east." We shall start by investigating the word עֵדֶן to see if it throws light on the nature of this garden. The root of the word is uncertain in Hebrew; however, a connection with the Sumerian-Babylonian word edinu (steppe, wilderness, flatland) is possible. The word edinu appears once as a province in South Babylon while edin occurs in various combinations of geographic names.[36] No certain connection, however, can here be established with עֵדֶן. Moreover, Vriezen's[37] attempted derivation from Ras Shamra is improbable. We are, therefore, forced by our study to fall back on its occurrences in the Old Testament. עֵדֶן occurs 13 times in the singular, undetermined form to designate a location. In three cases in Gen. 2, 8. 10; 4, 16 the meaning is very definitely that of a geographic land. (גַּן-בְּעֵדֶן, מִקֶּדֶם-עֵדֶן) In three other cases (2, 15;3, 23-24) we notice a slight shift of meaning (גַּן-עֵדֶן, לְגַן-עֵדֶן, עֵדֶן, מִגַּן עֵדֶן) - no longer "garden in Eden", but "garden of Eden". In the 7 occurrences by the prophets, the meaning diverges even further from that of simply a geographic land. Is. 51, 3 sets Eden parallel to גַּן-יְהוָה. In the highly mythological passage in Ez. 28, גַּן-אֱלֹהִים is placed in apposition with Eden (v. 13). In Ez. 31, 9 we hear of "trees of Eden" which were in the garden of God (also 16. 18). Finally, a desolated land is contrasted to the "garden of Eden." (Ez. 36, 35; Joel 2, 3)

This use of the word by the prophets makes it very clear that Eden can represent a mythological garden of God. Now it is difficult to conceive of a development in which a geographic designation took on mythical character; however, the reverse process of a mythical land becoming a geographic designation is common. We can, therefore, conclude that Eden originally represented a mythical garden. In the phrase "garden of Eden" גן-עדן we have an intermediary stage in the development where Eden echos more the meaning of "delight" √עדן (LXX- παράδεισος).

The occurrence of Eden in ch. 2-3 evidences, however, a definite anti-mythical tendency on the part of the Yahwist. First, its grammatical form in 2, 8. 10 points to the fact that the Yahwist will have Eden understood simply as a land. Moreover, the garden is planted in Eden after the creation of man, which vitiates against the mythical idea that Yahweh lived there. (A trace, however, of the older mythical "Vorlage" evidences itself in 3, 8 with Yahweh strolling through his garden at dusk.) Finally, man was placed in the garden to work, not just to enjoy its luxury (2, 15).[38] This very sober description of the garden in paradise is especially noticeable when we recall the more voluptuous descriptions of the paradise found in the Israelite tradition. So in Amos 9, 13f the tremendous productivity of the returned paradise is painted as "mountains that drop sweet wine". And in Ez. 28, 11ff we get a glimpse of the garden of God filled with precious stones and dazzling in description.

That the garden in Eden was originally a mythical garden is abundantly witnessed to even in Gen. 2 by its further description: "and Yahweh God made to grow out of the ground every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food." (v. 9a) This verse is perhaps a doublet to v. 8 since in a garden, trees

are generally included. We learn from the immediate description of two of these trees that these are mythical trees: "and the tree of life in the middle of the garden and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil." (v. 9b)

1. עֵץ הַחַיִּים בְּתוֹךְ הַגָּן Ever since Budde's exhaustive study of this verse (Urgeschichte, p. 48ff) scholars are almost unanimously in agreement that something is wrong with the verse. The loose connection of עֵץ הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע at the end of the verse attracts immediate attention. Moreover, there are great logical difficulties since the remaining story concerns itself with only one tree, namely, the tree of knowledge, which stands also in the middle of the garden. (3, 3) However, without going into all the details of literary criticism, we can assert that even though the tree of life in this verse is secondary, the attempt to eliminate completely the tree of life as a motif from the story is false (contr. Budde). We shall later on deal with the problem of these varying traditions, but here we would like only to maintain the mythical character of this tree.

In 3, 22 man is driven out of the garden "lest he stretch out his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever." We see from this description that the tree of life belongs, first of all, in that category of objects which have the power of bestowing eternal life, such as life-giving water, life-giving plants, life-giving fruits, etc. The mythical idea represented in this belief conceives of life in terms of a material substance. If one can partake of this, then one receives as a possession eternal life. This belief is everywhere evidenced in the history of religion. In Babylon it takes the form most frequently of a life-giving plant. So Gilgamesh is promised by Utnapishtim eternal life from a magical plant growing in the sea.[39] Moreover,

the evidence points most probably to the conclusion that by the Sumerians the mythical plant gishkin was a tree of life.[40] Its appearance is as a shining stone and its roots reach to the subterranean ocean. In Egypt the tree of life was pictured as a tall sycamore on which the gods sat and obtained immortality from eating.[41] The mythology of India describes a tree in heaven from which Yama with the other gods partake of the life-giving drink, "soma!"[42]

There is, however, another mythical idea connected with the tree of life which Holmberg[43] has particularly stressed, namely its cosmological significance. Gen. 2, 9 informs us that the tree of life stood "in the middle of the garden". Through many parallels in the history of religion, Holmberg has made most probably a connection between the tree of life and the "navel of the earth". In the primitive world picture the tree of life at the navel of the earth formed the axis on which the world revolved. When we take into consideration, furthermore, that according to the tradition in vv. 10-14 the garden of Eden was situated on a world-mountain, the hypothesis of Holmberg is very convincing. As we have pointed out, the position of the phrase "in the middle of the garden" (2, 9) presents many difficulties logically and grammatically with the rest of the story. It remains a possibility that the redactor on the basis of this tradition of the "navel of the earth" made his correction in 2, 9. We reserve to a later time our full discussion on this mythical motif.

2. וְעֵץ הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע (2, 9b)[44] The fact that great disagreement exists between scholars as to the meaning of the "tree of knowledge good and evil" calls for an exact examination of the terminology involved. The key phrases involved are the phrases: a) הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע (2, 17), b) יֹדְעֵי טוֹב וָרָע (3, 5), c) לָדַעַת טוֹב וָרָע (3, 22)

In the first place, Vriezen [45] has pointed out quite correctly that the investigation turns about the phrase הַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע and not טוֹב וָרָע alone. In the phrase a) הַהַדַּעַת טוֹב וָרָע we do not have a construct state followed by a genitive, but rather an infinitive constr., proceeded by an article, and followed by two accusatives. Therefore, we are concerned with the whole phrase "the knowledge good and evil" which cannot be separated from the knowledge. (יָדַע)

In b (3, 5) we are faced with another syntactical problem. The snake promises Adam and Eve that they shall be כֵּאלֹהִים יֹדְעֵי טוֹב וָרָע. The first problem to decide is whether כֵּאלֹהִים is plural or singular. Skinner[46] and Humbert[47] propose the plural "as gods" basing the argument upon 3, 22 where the plural is clearly stated. This is a possible interpretation. Budde believes the ambiguity is the intention of the writer.[48] But most commentators prefer reading the singular since it fits better into the context in which the snake is accusing God personally of falsehood and selfish motives. That the meaning in 3, 5 is the same as in 3, 22 cannot be taken for granted. If we chose the singular reading, we are still faced with a difficulty. Does the sentence mean: 1) You shall be as God in that you know good and evil, or 2) You shall be like God, that is, knowing good and evil like God also knows? In the first instance the knowledge good and evil is the means to become like God. In the second instance, the knowledge good and evil is not equality with God, but only a divine attribute. In each case, we receive no direct information as to the content of the knowledge. We are forced for the present to leave the problem open, concluding only that the knowledge good and evil is a divine prerogative.

In 3, 22 Yahweh confirms the fact that man has become "like one of us knowing good and evil". The force of the plural can by no means be removed as Coppens attempts.[49] Yahweh addresses the elohim beings about him, and admits that man has become "elohimartig". Man did not become equal to Yahweh himself, but to the elohim. The problem is the same as in 3, 5. Is it this knowledge that equates him with the elohim or is he like the elohim in that they also possess the knowledge? We can once again only conclude that the knowledge is a divine prerogative, but we receive no further light on the content of this knowledge.[50]

We are forced to examine the parallel passages in an attempt to determine the content of this knowledge good and evil. Those passages with constructions such as יָדַע בֵּין-ל" (or its equivalent) like 2 Sam. 19, 36; Jona 4, 11 and Is. 7, 15 (בָּחַר and מָאַס) must be regarded as not representing exact parallels. The key passages which afford parallels are: Deut. 1, 39; Gen. 31, 24; 2 Sam. 14, 17. 20. Especially is the last passage of importance. David is addressed as a מַלְאַךְ הָאֱלֹהִים v. 17 able to hear (discern) good and bad. In v. 20 there is a commentary stating that the mal'ak ha-'elohim "knows all things that are in the earth." Furthermore, when one considers the Hebrew art of expressing a totality by two extremes, Ps. 139, 2 "down-sitting and uprising", Gen. 31, 24 "neither good nor bad", we are supported in our understanding of the phrase knowing good and evil as meaning knowing everything. Vriezen[51], Humbert[52], and Coppens[53] come to a similar conclusion, by and large. Humbert (p. 91), however, is correct in allowing within the idea of totality of knowledge the element of discernment, which is denied by Vriezen.

In the light of these results, we feel forced to reject the following interpretations: 1) the tree of knowledge good and evil as the means to sexual knowledge,[54] 2) tree of knowledge good and evil as means to worldly knowledge, culture, or reason,[55] 3) tree of knowledge as means to moral knowledge.[56] The tree of knowledge was the means to divine knowledge, the prerogative only of divine beings. We shall elaborate further on its meaning when we discuss the subject of the fall.

Finally, we reach our chief question, namely, what is the mythological part in the tree of knowledge good and evil? Certainly the idea that a divine knowledge be obtained by eating a particular luscious fruit is a mythical motif, common also to the fairy tale.[57] Moreover, that this knowledge be forbidden to man by the gods is part of the common mythical motif of divine jealousy which we will discuss later in connection with 3,22. Then again, the symbol of nakedness as a recognition of this knowledge might perhaps reflect a mythical background from an earlier tradition, but the evidence in our present text is very meager. In so far, the sexual interpretation contains a measure of truth. However, the mythological content within the old mythical framework has been very much weakened by the Yahwist. The point of the story as now presented by the Yahwist concerns itself chiefly with obedience or disobedience to God's command. Only in the older "Vorlage" do we see now and then (especially 3,22) concern over the mythical effects of the fruit.

E. The Four World-Rivers, 2,10-14[58]

Commentators are in full agreement that these verses represent a separate tradition, both in style and content differing markedly from

that which proceeds and follows it. Let us start with the most sure reference, namely, the fourth of these rivers פְּרָת (v. 14). There is no doubt that this is the Euphrates river, the name stemming from the Accadian purattu. The third river, the חִדֶּקֶל, appears only once again in Dan. 10, 4 but represents most certainly the Tigris river. It is closer defined as flowing קִדְמַת אַשּׁוּר (v. 14). קִדְמַת is best translated "to the east of", but also can mean "in front of". Gressmann[59] believes אַשּׁוּר to be the old capital city of Ashur, replaced about 1300 by Salmanassar I, which actually lay on the west bank of the Tigris. This conclusion is not certain, however, since Ashur appears nowhere else in the Old Testament as the city. Yet the choice of the verb points to its being a city. If a land had been meant, then we would expect either the verb עבר "flow through" or סבב "encircle".

The second river is the Gihon which encircles the whole land of Cush. The name Gihon appears as a spring east of Jerusalem (1 Ki. 1, 33, etc.) but is otherwise unknown. The land of Cush is usually identified with Ethiopia (LXX). Jewish and Christian tradition have identified Gihon with the Nile (cf. LXX Jer. 2, 18 Γηών for the Hebrew שִׁחוֹר "arm of the Nile"). But does the Nile "encircle" the "whole land of Ethiopia"? The phraseology points to a very vague, fanciful geographical knowledge.

The first river is the Pishon encircling all the land of Havilah where "there is gold.. bdellium and the onynx stone". The word חֲוִילָה occurs in Gen. 10, 7. 29; 25, 18 (cf. I S. 15, 7). In Gen. 10, 7 it is connected with the land of Cush, but in v. 29 and 25, 18 it appears clearly as South-West Arabia. (cf. Koehler Lexicon p, 281). F. Delitzsch, Procksch, and Vriezen connect the

word with the root חול as the "land of sand". The Pishon must therefore be considered a river coming from India encircling all of Arabia.[60] In light of this, the most probable choice for the first river is the Indus.

When we review now this geographical description, we see that the picture is obviously that of the antique world with the four world rivers. The Indus was conceived of as encircling Arabia and flowing into the Nile. The Nile, in turn, crossed below the Persian Gulf and encircled Ethiopia. This presupposes that Africa and India were connected, which was the common concept of the antique world (cf. Arrian VI, I).[61] This should not appear too strange when we consider that down to the time of Alexander's Indian expedition the Indian Ocean was completely unknown, and since only the northern half of the Arabian and Persian Gulfs were known, they were considered as lakes. The actual mythical element is found in v. 10. These four rivers spring from the same source in the mythical "Gottesgarten" in Eden and from there encircle the entire world. We have here, first of all, the idea of life-giving water, paralleling closely the life-giving trees of Eden.[62] Moreover, Eden is conceived of as the "world-mountain", far in the north, from which the four world rivers find their source. We shall, however, postpone our discussion of this "world-mountain in the north" myth to a later chapter, and concentrate now on the world rivers.

The idea of the four world streams goes back ultimately to the antique conception of the four divisions of the earth which the Babylonian, Egyptian, and Indian religions all share. In the Rgveda (I. 62. 6) we have the similar idea of four world-rivers.[63] Kirfel comments that the idea probably stemmed from the thought that the four rivers spring from the heavenly

ocean which was contained above the firmament. The Iranian mythology[64] tells of another primeval source of water for the whole world, the Ardvisura, which plunges down to the sea from the world-mountain Hukairya. Significantly also the tree of life with its magical drink grows at the source on the mountain. This same idea of a world-river was greatly elaborated, finally, in the late Jewish tradition.[65]

F. The Snake as Seducer, 3, 1-5

In 3, 1 the snake is introduced as being one of the animals which God had created, moreover, as the cleverest. He is not Satan, nor a demon, but according to v. 1 simply the wisest of God's creatures. The fact that the serpent can speak is nothing unusual in a "Gottesgarten," and affords no surprise to the woman. But we are amazed at the conversation of the serpent. How are we to account for this cleverly developed style of seduction? Where did he acquire this divine wisdom about the tree? And most of all, how do we account for the outspoken hatred against God? What seemed to be once a simple snake has taken on a most complicated character.

It is not surprising, therefore, when the answers of O. T. scholars indicate much divergence as to the nature and role of the snake. The older view[66] which saw in the snake of Gen. 3 an analogous monster to Tiamat in Gen. 1 has little to commend it. While it is true that both creatures possess an anti-godly hatred, their other characteristics diverge greatly. Tiamat is a fearful monster in appearance, possessing cosmological powers which he uses in open battle. The snake of Gen. 3 is cunningly deceptive with no repulsive appearance. The comparison confirms our opinion that Gen. 3 stems from a different tradition as Gen. 1.

Vriezen[67] has brought forth strong arguments to support the view that the snake in Gen. 3 is by nature basically a magical or "Weisheitstier". He points out that the root נחש has the meaning of "practicing divination", and that in several places in the O. T. (Nu. 21, 9; 2 Kings 18, 4) the snake is joined directly with magic. He is supported by Baudissin[68] who has made it very probable that the Israelites took over a snake worship from the Canaanites similar to that of the Phoenician Esmun cult. This claim that the snake in the west Semitic world was a sacred animal, the object of worship, and not an enemy of man is further supported by the recent archaeological evidence of the snake cult.[69] Vriezen finds the point of the story in a condemnation of all magical knowledge as anti-godly because of its striving for divine knowledge. Moreover, there is a strong polemic contained against snake worship. (so also Skinner). While many of the traits of the "Weisheitstier" as propounded in this theory are present in Gen. 3, one misses important elements through this identification. The whole side of the snake's activity as a seducer is strangely missing from the picture. Vriezen is aware of this lack when he attributes these characteristics of the seducer to a "specifiek israëlietisch-jahwistische schepping." (p. 179) Furthermore, the viscious hatred of the serpent toward God does not find an adequate explanation in the above theory. Finally, the cult plays a minor role, if one at all, in Gen. 3.

Gressmann[70] finds in the figure of the snake a dualistic concept. He brings death, but is the source of life. His trait of eating dust[71] as well as his connexion with death leads Gressman to see in the snake a god of the underworld. In Gen. 3 we have a combat between Yahweh, the god of the heavens,

and the god of the nether-world. Hehn also stresses the chthonian character of the snake.[72] This theory explains very well then the hatred of the snake toward Yahweh, and the desire to win Eve to his underground kingdom. But here again, the theory is not without its difficulties. A connection between the snake and the underworld is nowhere found in the text. The idea that the snake eats dust can well revert to a primitive notion rather than a mythological. This theory suffers by introducing traits taken from the general history of religion which in this case disturb rather than enlighten our understanding of the role of the snake.

In light of the above criticism, I feel that the explanation of Gunkel is still the most satisfactory: "urspruenglich wird die'Schlange' ein boeser, Gott und den Menschen feindlicher Daemon in Schlangengestalt gewesen und in Israel zum Tier herabgedrueckt worden sein." (p. 15) On the one hand, the Yahwist was faced with the problem of how to explain the entrance of evil into God's paradise. On the other hand, he saw evil as a demonic power, but he could not allow a dualistic concept of evil.[73] This struggle is evidenced in the Yahwist's reworking of his older mythical "Vorlage". The snake was reduced formally to an animal of the creation, yet as far as his traits are concerned, he remains a demon. The fact that the snake spoke actually the truth in 3, 5 (cf. 3, 22) is a difficulty which also points to friction in the process of assimilation.

G. The Fall and the Lost Paradise, 3, 1ff.

In Gen. 3 the disobedience of Adam and Eve toward Yahweh's commandment leads directly to the curses and the loss of paradise. An examination of the curses indicates clearly the type of tradition with which we

are dealing. The snake is cursed to go on its belly and eat dirt. (3, 14) The woman must henceforth bear children in pain and be a subordinate to the man. (3, 15f) The man must eke out a tedious existance toiling with the ground which Yahweh has cursed. (3, 17f) Gunkel (p. 20f) has rightly pointed out that we have here independent aetiological motifs which have been put by the Yahwist into the framework of the lost paradise. In Gen. 3 we have, therefore, an aetiological myth which would explain the presence of suffering and sorrow in the world as the result of a transgression in the primeval golden age.

Similar aetiological myths are widespread in the history of religion, especially among those peoples with an extensive paradise tradition. The Babylonian myths of Gilgamesh[74] and Adapa[75] have in common with that of Genesis the theme of a "verscherztes ewiges Leben". In the Iranian tradition the golden age was lost and the present age of suffering and death began when Yima, through a misdeed, was forced to relinquish his kingdom to the evil adversary Angra-mainyu.[76] Hesiod tells of a golden age in which man lived in eternal joy and happiness, which was lost through the ὕβρις of man, who failed to honor the gods as he ought.[77]

H. The "Jealousy of the Gods", 3, 22

There is another mythical motif in Gen. 3 which is closely connected with that of the lost paradise. In v. 22 Yahweh addresses his court: "the man is become as one of us, knowing good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life and eat, and live for ever--therefore Yahweh God sent him forth." V. 22 is probably best construed as an anakolouthon rather than to take פֶּן in its pregnant use. Yahweh expresses fear lest (פֶּן) the man once again exceed his right by taking of the

tree of life and live forever. Obbink[78] has attempted to translate פֶּן with "lest again", "lest furthermore" to fit in with his hypothesis that it was only the continual eating from the tree of life which afforded eternal life. While the thesis is supported by analogy in other religions, the grammatical use of פֶּן makes this interpretation improbable.[79] Yahweh fears that the man eat once and obtain divine life. To prevent this, man is banned from paradise.

We have here clearly the mythical motif of the "jealousy of the gods" (cf. Gen. 11, 6). The confirmation of man's similarity contains no irony, but rather sorrow and fear. This is the predominant motif in the Adapa myth where Adapa fails to attain eternal life through the deception of Ea. The classical expression of this motif is found in Prometheus myth.[80] He steals fire from the gods for the welfare of the human race, but reaps the revenge of the gods and causes sorrow and death for the world.

I. Eve, as the Mother of All Life, 3, 20

It is the common consent of scholars that 3, 20 does not suit in its present position. In the first place, it is hardly the place to give one's wife an honorary title between the curses and the expulsion from paradise. Moreover, Eve is designated throughout this chapter as "the woman" which suits much better with Adam, used as an appellative throughout. Finally, Eve has had no children. These reasons make the conclusion certain that this verse stems from another tradition that has in some way found its way into the text.

The etymology of the word חַוָּה is very controversial. Koehler's Lexicon indicates nine varying derivations. Our interest is directed chiefly to the attempt to find in the word a mythological being. While rabbinical

exegesis had long drawn the parallel between חַוָּה and the Aramaic חִוְיָא (serpent), the actual controversy began from a Punic text published by Lidzbarski:[81] רבת חות אלת מלכת . Lidzbarski saw in the word חות the figure of a Phoenician snake-goddess, translating the text: Herrin, Schlange, Goettin, Koenigin. He was followed in this by Gressmann[82] and Albright.[83]

Over against this derivation many other possibilities have been suggested. H. Bauer,[84] taking his starting point from the Hebrew חוּת sing. חָוָה tent dwelling, proposes the meaning "woman". He thinks this would suit better also in Lidzbarski's text in the sense of "Madonna, Unsere liebe Frau". I. Eitan[85] lays the emphasis on אם as a synonym of חַוָּה, and suggesting an Arabic root hawa "to bring forth", he gives to חַוָּה the meaning of genetrix. Furthermore, Vriezen[86] points out that in Lidzbarski's text the three other words have the function of epitheta ornantia. Woman or genetrix would then be a more suitable translation. This discussion has made it evident that any quick mythical identification is dangerous. While leaving the possibility open, we feel that alone the etymological evidence is not sufficient to specify here a mythological background.

Gressmann[87] and later Rhodokanakis[88] have brought forth other proof by which to support this identification of Eve with the snake. They have emphasized the close connection between the two in the conversation (3, 1-5). Although the command was given to the man, yet the temptation concerns itself only with the woman. Then again, in the curses the close connection between Eve and the snake is unusual. Rhodakanakis concludes: "Am Suendenfall des ersten Menschen sind also urspruenglich bloss drei Personen

beteiligt: Jahwe, der Luft-und Himmelsgott, Eva, die'Schlange', also die Erd- und Muttergoettin im Schlangengestalt, und Adam." (p. 76) But there are very definite difficulties with this hypothesis. Surely the connection of Eve and the snake is a close one, but it is always antipathetical. This difficulty is hardly met by Gressmann,who attempts to bridge it with the old rabbinical exegesis: "Denn Eva ist gewissermassen selbst eine Schlange, da sie den Menschen zum Ungehorsam gegen Gott reizt." (p. 358) While we find it difficult to see evidence of an original snake mythology in our text, there is, however, an obvious mythical motif here. In the expression, "mother of all life," we have the idea that all life stems from one source. All life is thought of in terms of birth which is the characteristic of the mother-earth mythology.

J. The Cherubs and the Flaming Sword, 3,24

The derivation of כְּרוּב is uncertain. The older attempt to combine directly with γρύψ has been generally abandoned, although we might well have here a naturalized foreign world. Likewise, the theory of a methathesis from רכב , suggested by Ps. 104,3 seems very questionable. Rather, the connection with the Accadian seems most probable. In the first place, the Accadian kuribu suggests itself, which could then easily with vocal assimilation from kurubu give the form כְּרוּב. Moreover, the word must then originally have been borrowed since krb appears only in the Accadian. Both Gesenius-Buhl and Dhorne-Vincent[89] suggest a connection with ברך which as karabu possess the double meaning of pray and bless.

The problem is made complex since the function of the kuribu in Babylon is not completely clear. The form karibu (karibati) appears parallel

to lamassu as a feminine. They seem to have had a double function of watchers of the temples and divine intercessors. Dhorme-Vincent have traced a development of the karibu within the Babylonian-Assyrian religion. While first being portrayed in human form as lower divinities with the function of intercession, in the later development their symbolic representation, extending into the grotesque, became dominant. The use of the cherubs in other parts of the O. T. would suggest a mixture of various influences. On the one hand, they appear as carriers of Yahweh (Ps. 18, 11) and suggest a personification of the clouds. Moreover, they appear in the temple guarding the ark (1 Ki. 6, 23-28); then again, as wall decoration (1 Ki. 6, 28-35), and bearers of Yahweh's throne (Ez. 10, 1f). In Gen. 3, 24 they are more closely related to that of the Babylonian. As demoniac guardians they guard the only entrance to the presence of the deity.

Furthermore, the connection with the "flaming sword, turning every way" would substantiate this interpretation. In Babylon the karibi are linked with the lahmu, who symbolize in a much more grotesque manner the defense of the sacred temple from intruders. Thureau-Dangin[90] connects the flaming sword with a copper thunderbolt made by Tiglathpilesar I as a victory symbol over and warning to a vanquished foe. Dhorme-Vincent accept this theory and see in it a later symbolic substitution for the lahmu. Albright's proposal[91] that the flaming sword originated as a "miscomprehension of the purpose of the winged solar disk" used to ensure crop fertility, has little to support it.

It is a later misunderstanding which has the flaming sword in the hands of the cherub (first in the "Cave of Treasure" 5, 14). The earlier,

more mythical idea is of the sword as an independent magical weapon against which there is no defense. It is a type of demonic being, an echo of which is still found in the prophets (Is. 34, 5; Ez. 21, 8ff. etc.). This motif occurs frequently in the fairy tale. In the Irish tale of Fionn and Lorian[91a] we hear of the venture after the "flaming sword". Furthermore, in the German fairy tale, the famous sword of Freyr "swings by itself".[91b] It is evident that this idea is not native to Israel, but similarly to that of the cherubim entered Israel's tradition from outside.

III. The Nature and Origin of the Mythical Tradition

A. In our preliminary discussion of the sources within chapter 2-3, we saw that O. T. scholars are united on the fact of various sources, but disagree as to their nature. Moreover, we saw that the evidence seemed strong that already in its oral form various traditions had come together. We should now like to see what light our study of the mythical material can throw on the nature of the oral tradition used.

In the first place, we see that the mythical tradition used is made up of many self-contained, independent motifs. So the mythical motifs אָדָם - הַחַוָּה (2, 7) and אִישׁ - אִשָּׁה (2, 23) grew out of popular etymologies. Then again, the many aetiological myths all give evidence to a period of independent existence before being incorporated into the larger framework. The curses (3, 14f) are good examples of this process in which small, popular aetiologies were formed later into one large aetiological myth of the "lost paradise". The loose literary connection with the chapter as a whole shows that the mythical motifs of the "four world-rivers" and "Eve as the mother of all life" were from independent sources. The extremely mythical nature

of their content would point to an oral tradition, not native to Israel, from which we have most probably just a fragment. Especially the four world-river motif appears fragmentary and has in no sense a self-contained point like an aetiology or popular etymology.

Furthermore, the actual discrepancies within the mythical material point to varying traditions. This is very evident with the two mythical trees in Eden. The tradition in which man was given free access to the tree of life in the garden (2, 9) cannot be the same as in 3, 22, in which man is expelled in order that he not eat from the tree. The exact form of these two original motifs is impossible to reconstruct. The suggestion of Gunkel (p. 26) of one story with one tree, and one with two is very probable. The later tradition was connected in some way with the "Goetterneid" theme. Exactly this connection makes it impossible to harmonize the two tree motifs, as, for example, Humbert proposes to do with the thesis of a hidden tree of life. (p. 21f)

There are other internal frictions within the mythical motifs which point to varying traditions not yet fully assimilated. The tradition that man was created out of the soil to work the soil 2, 7-15 (אדם - אדמה) cannot completely be reconciled to the curse in 3, 17f, even when we interpret the curse as primarily the lack of productivity of the soil. 2, 7-15 and 3, 17f. present actually two different processes of thought. The first is primarily aetiological dealing with the relation of man to the soil. The latter is mythological based on the idea of the increasing difficulty in the conditions of life, but here also used in an aetiological manner. In the primeval time everything grew from itself.[92] Furthermore, the aetiology of the sexual attraction (איש - אשה) contradicts the tradition of shame at nakedness (3,7f)

even though the Yahwist has done his best to fit these two traditions into a new framework. Finally, the basically different attitude to the role of the woman in ch. 2-3 witnesses to originally varying traditions, even though the Yahwist has used this change effectively to illustrate the "Entherrlichung" of woman.

B. We have tried to demonstrate that many varying mythical traditions have made up the oral tradition which forms the basis of our text. We now turn to the problem of determining the scope of these traditions: that is, to what extent the mythical motifs were united within the oral tradition. If we can find evidence of a connection between the same mythical motifs in other parts of the O. T., then we have some support to postulate a mythical tradition in Israel.

We turn then to the paradise tradition. A detailed investigation of the "wiederkehrende Paradies" shall occupy our attention later. Our purpose is now only to determine connections between mythical motives common to Gen. 2-3. As we have already shown, the tradition of Eden as a "Gottesgarten" is known by the prophets (Ez. 36, 35; Is. 51, 3; Joel 2, 3), but a description of paradise without the specific name is more common. The tradition of the world-mountain is witnessed to in Is. 2, 2, Mi. 4, 1, Sach 14, 8, etc. In Is. 2, 2 and 11, 9 the motif of world peace is joined with the world-mountain. The description of the peace among the creatures is much more mythological in Is. 11, 6f. than Gen. 2. Ez. 47, 1, Joel 4, 18 and Sach. 14, 8 connect a life-giving water to the idea of the mountain. In Ez. 47, 12, moreover, the magical trees appear. Sach. 1, 8 witnesses also to a "Weltbaum" as belonging to the description of paradise. In light of these parallels, which

differ so strongly in points from Gen. 2-3, we feel safe to conclude that a paradise tradition was common in Israel, which included such motifs as "Gottesgarten", "world-mountain" and "primeval peace".

When we come to search for parallels to the myth of the fall and the lost paradise, we are amazed at the lack of echo in the Old Testament. Gunkel has attempted (p. 33f) to find in Job 15, 7f a reference to an illegal stealing of knowledge away from the gods. This interpretation is controverted by Budde but accepted by Holscher. The ASV and RSV translations give the passage another meaning when translating: "Have you listened in the council of God? And do you limit wisdom to yourself."? But אזל does not have this meaning, but rather "to take off to oneself" (Koehler). It would seem, therefore that Gunkel's interpretation is the more likely; however, the reference is too brief to draw any certain conclusions concerning the "Urmensch".

We will have an opportunity later to discuss in detail Ez. 28, 12-19. We can here, however, anticipate our study by stating that we do not think that this passage affords a parallel to the same tradition as Gen. 2-3. The decisive difference is that the divine being in Ez. is killed. We do not have a reference to the "Urmensch", but a rebellion within the circle of the gods. However, the reoccurrence of similar individual motifs to the tradition in Gen. 2-3 should not be overlooked. We read of a perfect creature (v. 21) in the garden of God (v. 13) situated on a holy mountain (v. 14). This creature was blamelessly (v. 15) until he sinned in trying to be as God (v. 6. 17). Five motifs which we have singled out as mythical in Gen. 2-3 reoccur: 1) the mythical garden of Eden, 2) the world mountain (no mention of rivers,

however), 3) a type of fall (here we do not have an exact parallel), 4) "the jealousy of the gods" (not an exact, but similar situation), 5) the cherub. We can only conclude that in spite of basically different traditions, many of the mythical motifs are shared.

Finally, we turn to the creation myth. The motif that man was formed from earth appears frequently elsewhere in the O. T. (Ps. 90, 3; 103, 14, etc.), but nowhere is it connected with the creation of woman. Moreover, the myth of woman being created from man finds no other reference in the O. T. In the light of this lack of parallels, we are led to suspect no unified oral tradition containing the creation motifs. This suspicion is confirmed by internal evidence within ch. 2. The connection between the creation of man and of the woman is very loose indeed. Man's creation is joined with the paradise myth of the garden. Moreover, the creation of woman is joined with the motif of primeval peace which can hardly be original. We are led to the conclusion that the creation motifs of primeval chaos, creation of man and creation of woman were very loosely connected in an oral tradition, if at all.

C. We shall now turn our attention to the origin of these oral traditions.

1. The Creation Traditions

Certainly the idea of a primeval state existing before Yahweh's creation is not native to Israel. While in Gen. 1 the description of a watery chaos points to Babylon as the place of origin, the arid state in Gen. 2 would hardly stem from the same area. We must look rather to a dry, arid land where the coming of rain provides an analogy for the creation. Furthermore, the creation of man could only have stemmed from a farming community.

The whole tone of this tradition differs from the sacred tradition of Gen. 1. This is rather a popular, common tradition of the people engaged in agriculture. The very anthropomorphic language in relation to God would speak for its antiquity. The same observation can be made for the creation of the woman. She is to be a help for the man in his work. The fresh, naive character would well indicate an origin among the common people rather than the product of priestly tradition. For the origin of the creation traditions we can conclude that no evidence is available which would indicate a specific origin. The content of the myths is too widespread to be of help. We can only suppose that these were popular traditions circulating among the people in Canaan and northern Mesopotamia.

2. Paradise Traditions

Vriezen[93] has put forth the thesis that the idea of a paradise was lacking in the Semitic world. By "paradise" he specifies "de aardsche gelukkige woonplaats van de eerste menschen". (p. 7) An investigation of this thesis should shed light on our problem of the origin of this motif in Gen. 2-3. We shall try to summarize briefly the evidence. First, in regard to the Sumerian mythology, the chief text concerned is the much discussed Nippur 4561.[93a] The entire discussion has entered a new phase, however, since Vriezen's book due to the new research of S. N. Kramer.[94] His translation indicates on the one hand that, over against the view of Langdon, Dilmun cannot be considered as a paradise in the narrow sense. The poem is concerned, not with primeval man at all, but rather with action between gods. On the other hand, the new translation shows that we have here more than just a description of a primeval state before the creation as Vriezen (p. 39)

wants to interpret it. Following the description of Dilmun, there is no creation account which would be necessary for Vriezen's thesis, rather, only an anthropomorphic description in l. 68-72 of the formation of the marshlands in all probability. We can conclude, therefore, that while a paradise of primeval man is not given, yet the actual description of Dilmun contains definite elements of a paradise. Furthermore, to support his thesis Vriezen brings a text published by Chiera[95], Nippur 14005, which describes the primeval state of mankind not as being in a type of paradise, but on the animal level. Turning to the Babylonian-Assyrian myths, Vriezen cites passages from the Gilgamesh epos which indicate that the sources of man's sorrow does not stem from a loss of paradise, but rather is contained ontologically in his being human.[96]

To this thesis of Vriezen the following can be said: 1) reference to certain passages which vitiate against a paradise tradition are not conclusive proof that no concept of paradise whatever existed in Babylon. Varying traditions within one culture are frequent, 2) all the individual motifs for a paradise picture are present, "Gottesgarten", magical trees, primeval peace etc., although a unified concept fails, 3) the idea of a paradise is so widespread among ethnic cultures that we must always reckon with the failure of sufficient source material in regard to Babylon.

Turning now to the individual paradise motifs, the tradition of world-rivers, two of which are the Tigris and Euphrates, point most definitely to a Babylonian origin. This tradition bears the marks of a fragment from an academic priestly tradition, and differs completely in style from the other traditions of Gen. 2-3. The mythical garden tradition is once again too

widespread to determine exactly its origin. The idea of a garden, in which the god is at home, could suit well to the Ba'al cult, although we have seen that such gardens are well known in Babylon. The motif of the world-mountain, which we will discuss in detail later, is shared by Babylon and Canaan.

To conclude our discussion of the origin of the paradise myths, we can state that the motifs within the paradise tradition are everywhere in the history of religion evidenced. Only with great reservation can be suggested a definite place of origin. The tradition in Gen. 2-3 shows, however, strongly the signs of being moulded into a Hebrew form. While the individual motifs are mostly borrowed tradition, their present form and framework can be attributed to the work of the Yahwist.

3. The Tradition of the Fall

There have been frequent attempts to find in Babylon the origin of the tradition of the fall. Concerning the famous "Suendenfallzylinder"[96a] there is now agreement that its connection with Gen. 3 is very improbable. The horns of the headdress of the male figure as signs of the divinity would suggest a mythological subject. The failure of an accompanying text, however, makes it impossible to arrive at any certain conclusion. The same thing applies to the cylinders published by Toscanne[97] with the heading: "la tentation". Hehn[98] rightly objects to the very subjective judgment in reading into these cylinders Biblical motifs.

The literary epics of Babylon provide also little help. As mentioned in another context, both the Gilgamesh epic and the Adapa myth have the

theme of a lost eternal life. But we can not speak of a fall here since the myths are concerned with man's vain effort to rise to immortality. We have actually the very opposite from a fall. As mentioned above, echoes of a lost paradise are reflected in most all ethnic religions. Such a theme forms a natural basis for an aetiological myth concerning man's dilemma and we are not surprised at its widespread character. An exact parallel, either in Babylonia or otherwise, is not yet come to light. Moreover, the very Hebraic character of the Gen. 3 story would lead us to believe that the Yahwist was very active in remoulding his older "Vorlage".

IV. The Assimilation of the Mythical Material in Israel

The evidence of a long period of assimilation within the Gen. account points to the early entrance of mythical tradition in Israel. When we compare the paradise tradition of the prophets, it is unthinkable that this change could have happened over night. The figure of the snake, with definite demonic characteristics retained from a mythical "Vorlage", points to a long battle, and to the caution with which the Yahwist moved in relation to his given tradition.

The coupling of varying traditions had certainly taken place before the Yahwist, that is already in the oral tradition stage. In that both a paradise tradition and a creation tradition speak of the beginning of man, a combination is easy to imagine. Into this loose framework of creation and paradise came the various individual motifs which we have discussed. By the repetition of the stories, the older motifs were expanded and drew to themselves material from other sources. This would account for the discrepancies with the organic whole.

But it would be a mistake to conclude that Gen. 2-3 is but an accidental conglomeration of contradictory myths. The remarkable thing in these chapters is exactly that a very definite unity has been achieved in spite of such varying motifs. In chapter 3 a closely knit narrative with a mounting climax is evidenced, achieved with no superfluous words. V. 22, which, as we have seen, stems from a different tradition originally than the rest of ch. 3, is used as the grounds for expulsion from the garden. It is difficult to determine whether this unity belongs to the "Vorlage" or is the work of the Yahwist. Certainly it is not unthinkable that already in the oral tradition this organic unity was formed. The simple, direct style with a minimum of words is characteristic of an oral tradition. But there are signs which point later on to the work of the Yahwist. Certainly there was an oral "Vorlage" already in ch. 2. When we see, for example, in 2, 25 a clever literary device by which the loosely connected motifs in ch. 2 are used as background and point to the coming narrative in ch. 3, then we are beyond the realm of oral tradition. In the joining of these two traditions into an organic closely knit unity, we can see the achievement of the Yahwist.

The theological achievements are, none the less, remarkable. In the first place, the Yahwist has reworked the old motif of the "Gottesgarten". Paradise is not possession of the gods in which a happy mortal might perhaps one day enter, but a place fashioned <u>after</u> the creation of man in which he can work. The Yahwist brings here to expression that paradise is not a <u>possession</u>, but a <u>relationship</u>. It is the conscious picture for the nearness to God. This is confirmed when we examine closer the description of the

garden. There man talks directly with God and God expresses concern for his creature (2, 18). There is no feeling of shame since the man is in full harmony with himself. The peace among all the animals pictures the undisturbed harmony of the cosmos. The words of Yahweh in 2, 16-17 make it once again evident that we have in Eden a relationship with God pictured through the old mythical forms. The tree of knowledge is reworked by the Yahwist to express the command of obedience. Man is placed in a continual position of decision.

So also the reworking of the serpent myth shows deep insights into the theology of the Yahwist. Although remaining unable to bridge the tension caused by the older "Vorlage", the figure of the serpent is pushed to the periphery of the story and left hanging in the air. The Yahwist leaves the question of the origin of evil unanswered, but directs the light on man and his guilt. In the same way the old aetiologies serve to underscore the break of man with God. The difficulty that man did not directly die is unanswered. Rather, the Yahwist reinterprets the material so that man's whole life is now seen as a type of death without God. When we view the whole primeval history of J, we see that here in Gen. 2-3 we have but the first chapter of a "Suendengeschichte".

CHAPTER IV AN EXEGESIS OF GENESIS 6, 1-4[1]

I. Evidence of Mythical Material in Gen. 6, 1-4

V. 1 "And it came to pass, when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, and daughters were born unto them.." V. 1 begins with no connection to anything previous, but with a vague reference to the distant past. Grammatically the construction is clear with the apodosis beginning in v. 2. Furthermore, הָאָדָם is obviously the whole of mankind.

V. 2a "that the sons of god(s) saw the daughters of men that they were fair".. בְּנֵי־הָאֱלֹהִים The phrase occurs again in Job 1, 6; 2, 1, בְּנֵי־אֱלֹהִים in 38, 7. Closely allied are the בְּנֵי אֵלִים Ps. 29, 1; 89, 7. (cf. Dan. 3, 25 בַּר אֱלָהִין). The בְּנֵי־הָאֱלֹהִים are individuals of the class god, just as the בְּנֵי הָאָדָם (1S. 26, 19) are individuals of the class man, and בְּנֵי הַנְּבִיאִים (1 Ki. 20, 35) are individuals of the class prophet. (cf. G-K. 128v) The context in which the phrase "בְּנֵי הָאֵ appears points to an original plurality of elohim. So in Job 38, 7 the bene elohim are paralleled with the stars. 1 Ki. 22, 19, which presents a close analogy to Job 1, 6 speaks of "all the host of heaven"(כָּל־צְבָא הַשָּׁמַיִם). We see very clear traces of an old astral mythology which later was strongly opposed. (Dt. 4, 19; Jer. 8, 2) This is strongly supported by the phrase בְּנֵי אֵלִים which is clearly a plural. The phrase bene elohim points to a time in which there was a class of gods.

Beyond this, in this passage the phrase "the sons of gods" indicates more than just a class of gods. Rather, we have here a fragment belonging most probably to an original theogony.[1a] These are the physical sons of the gods, the younger offspring who trouble the older generation by their

undisciplined spirit. They concentrate especially in adventures of love. This physical begetting of a series of gods is common in most all the ethnic religions. (cf. Enuma elish I for the tension between the older and younger generation of gods).

The attempt has often been made,[2] trying to avoid the consequences of the above interpretation, to interpret bene elohim as a special type of pious, noble people (Sethians) over against the irreligious or unworthy "daughters of men" (Canaanites). The occurrence of the word "son", in relation to Yahweh as a title for Israel, cannot be brought to bear as an argument. (Dt. 14, 1; 32, 5; Hos. 2, 1) Not only do we have here an exalted rhetorical style differing completely from Gen. 6, 1-4, but also these phrases do not parallel the bene elohim. The only exact parallel would be bene Yahweh which is strictly avoided in the Old Testament. Finally, and a decisive argument from the context against all such "ethical" misinterpretations, is the fact that the הָאָדָם in v. 1 indicates clearly the whole class of mankind. This cannot suddenly assume a restricted sense in v. 2. The phrase בְּנוֹת הָאָדָם indicates, therefore, the daughters within the class of mankind, and not a particular type.

V. 2b "and they took from them wives of all that they chose". The partitive use of מִן is expressed in מִכֹּל. Due to the supernatural powers of the bene elohim, they were able to act as they wished among the daughters of mortals. The idea of unrestrained polygamy among the gods, depicted as masculine, and the helplessness of the mortal women to resist their advances is a common mythical motif. The belief that gods could consort with mortals is especially prevalent among the Greek and Phoenician

mythology.[3]

V. 3 "And Yahweh said: My spirit shall not abide (?) with man forever, because (?) he is flesh; and his days shall be a hundred and twenty years". This verse bristles with difficulties to such an extent that it is impossible to know if a fully satisfactory solution can ever be obtained. This verse breaks in so abruptly into that which proceeds it that we can be sure of the work of redaction. Up to this point, we had heard nothing about Yahweh. Suddenly, we have a judgment in the form of a "Jahwe Spruch".

יָדוֹן - LXX(Καταμείνῃ), Vulgate, Peshitto, and Targum of Onkelos indicate the meaning "abide", "remain"; Symmachus renders it "judge" (κρινεῖ). Both of these are etymologically doubtful. In regard to the latter, there is no evidence to suppose the root דון meaning to judge, appears ever with a waw. The other attempts at derivation (cf. Gunkel, p. 57 for five) remain hypothetical. L. Koehler Lexicon leaves it unexplained. From the context we can only suppose that the common rendering "abide" is fairly close to its meaning.

רוּחִי - There are two chief views in the history of exegesis as to meaning of the ruah. The first sees the רוּחַ as the divine principle of life, planted in man at the creation (2, 7). The point of the judgment would then be that Yahweh shortens man's life to 120 years by withdrawing his spirit. (Dillmann) Although this interpretation actually seems the more favorable, the difficulty with this interpretation is that it has little connection with vv. 1 and 2, and connects poorly with what follows הוּא בָשָׂר. The second interpretation, proposed by Wellhausen, is that the רוּחַ is the divine substance common to the gods. Because this has been mixed

with the human spirit, a disorder has entered the creation to which Yahweh pronounces a judgment. This interpretation does not fit well with 3b and logically, just the shortening of man's life would not prevent the propagation of the divine substance within the race. One would expect an annihilation. Wellhausen strikes 3b as a gloss (p. 308). We shall return to the problem when we consider the passage as a whole.

בְּאָדָם Who is here meant? In vv. 1 and 2 we have contended that הָאָדָם denotes mankind in general. Why should the judgment then fall on mankind? Moreover, when was the spirit of Yahweh promised to mankind בָּשָׂר? However, if we understand the אָדָם as the new generation produced by the union of the bene elohim, then we get some sense out of the phrase בָּשָׂר. The offspring of this unnatural union claim to have received from their divine fathers that supernatural substance which affords them eternal life - בָּשָׂר. The LXX points to this interpretation with their rendering ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τούτοις. בִּשְׁגָגָה This word is pointed by the majority of MSS as an infinitive constructus of שָׁגָה ("to err") with suffix. Then it is translated: "through their erring is he flesh". The enallage numeri, however, is very disturbing when we refer the suffix to הָאָדָם. If the suffix is made to refer to the bene elohim, then one is forced to disregard the accent as Holzinger (p. 65): "nicht soll mein Geist fuer immer im Menschengeschlecht...in Folge ihrer, der Engel, Verirrung". As Skinner (p. 143) rightly objects, the Hebrew style becomes impossible. The first part of the sentence is overloaded at the end, while the second part opens awkwardly.

Because of these difficulties, the punctuation בְּשַׁגַּם (בְּ + שֶׁ relative + גַּם also) is preferred by most modern commentators. (Gunkel, Skinner, Procksch, v. Rad) This reading of "because" has the support of the LXX, Peshitto, Targum of Onkelos, the Old Latin, and the Vulgate. That this reading also has its difficulties, can not be denied. The relative שֶׁ does appear in early Hebrew (Jud. 5, 7) occasionally, but its use is chiefly relegated to late Hebrew. This reading, however, only has meaning when we take the הָאָדָם (v. 3) as its antecedent denoting the new bastard generation. Then the גַּם sets these beings over against the rest of mankind. Yahweh withdraws his spirit, and in rejection of their claim to divinity, judges them also, that is, like the rest of mortal men, to be but בָּשָׂר. Bashar denotes here the temporal, corruptible, and weak side of the human nature over against the life-giving force of the ruah.

וְהָיוּ יְמֵי מֵאָה וְעֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה This verse also presents great difficulties. Is it referring to mankind in general or this new generation alone? Is it the time limit on individual life or a period of grace for all mankind? Against the theory that a time limit on individual life is set[4], it can be argued that we would have expected some previous mention as to the normal length of life if the reference to the 120 years is to have any meaning. We know, however, from Herodotus (I, 163; III, 23) that 120 years was considered the normal life of man in Egypt (cf. Gen. 50, 26:110 years). But does the 120 years mean that once they lived much longer, but now it is shortened as punishment as in Hesiod's Works and Days (130)? Or are the 120 years the normal age of man, and serve as a limit beyond which these men may not go? Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile this punishment of

life shortening with that preceeding. How could a mere shortening or restricting of life prevent the further propagation of the divine material in man?

Then again, against the theory of a period of grace for mankind, the following difficulties arise:[5] When הָאָדָם is used collectively, as in v. 1, it is referred to by a plural suffix בָּהֶם. When, however, in v. 3 a singular suffix is used יָדִין then an individual must be meant. Moreover, the connecting of the 120 years with a period of grace before the flood is very questionable. Gruppe[6] has advanced strongly this theory supporting it from a reconstructed Phoenician myth. The substance of the myth is that three generations of humanity had provoked the gods. The final act of ὕβρις was the attempt of Phaethon to fly to heaven, initiating the flood.[7] Gruppe attempts then to find a reflection of this tradition in the 120 years-3 x 40 as the average length of a generation. This theory fails to recognize the basic aetiological motif in Gen. 6, 1-4, as we shall see. The original myth had nothing to do with the flood. This theory confused primary and secondary traditions within the text. This will be demonstrated more thoroughly when we discuss the myth as a whole.

Finally, Kraeling[8] has advanced another theory to explain the 120 years. He finds in this number a polemic of the Yahwist against the Babylonian tradition of the antediluvian kings who lived immensely long lives. The Yahwist rejects this tradition by imposing an upper limit of 120 years. The figure 120- a trebled 40- has a "mythical or mystical significance" for Moses and other famous men died at this age. This line is not pressed further by Kraeling who finds in it finally just "a nicety of ancient story telling" (p. 201). This theory is actually a variation to the original time limit theory.

V. 4 "The giants (הַנְּפִלִים) were on the earth in those days, and also after that, when the sons of god(s) came in unto the daughters of men, and they bare children to them: these were the mighty men (הַגִּבֹּרִים) which were from old, the men of renown." נְפִלִים Although the etymology of the word is not certain,[9] the meaning of "giant" is assured from the context in Nu. 13, 33. The clause וְגַם אַחֲרֵי-כֵן is disturbing to the sentence. In the first place, it separates אֲשֶׁר from its antecedent, and logically it seems to be an afterthought on the part of a redactor who had in mind a tradition about giants as witnessed in such passages as Dt. 1, 28; 9, 2; Josuah 15, 14 etc. The evidence points strongly, therefore, to a later interpolation. Moreover, once the preceeding phrase has been removed as a gloss, the causal meaning of אֲשֶׁר (since or because) is to be preferred over the temporal. הָיְתָה refers to the נְפִלִים not to יָלְדוּ לָהֶם. The word נְפִלִים appears to have been an obsolete word even at the time of the Yahwist who explains this word with the common גִּבֹּרִים. That גִּבֹּרִים once contained a mythical and legendary character, is revealed from such passages as Ez. 32, 27 and Gen. 10, 8f. Later the word became common for a great war champion (1Sam. 17, 51), then for the professional soldier (1 Sam. 2, 4; 2 Ki. 24, 16) and the trained body guard (2 S. 20, 7).

Let us now examine v. 4 as a whole. The verse begins with no connection to that which preceeds it. In the present text, we have only a prosaic reference of archaeological interest stating the presence of giants on the earth as a contemporaneous phenomenon with the marriage of the bene elohim. However, once the gloss וְגַם אַחֲרֵי-כֵן is removed, and אֲשֶׁר takes a causal sense, then we become aware of the original function of this verse.

V. 4 forms a causal connection with vv. 1 and 2, not a mere contemporaneous. The הַגִּבֹּרִים are the fruit from the union of the bene elohim with the daughters of men.

II. Nature and Origin of the Mythical Tradition in Israel

The great difficulty which we have had with the text points to a very definite process of reworking and assimilation into the tradition of Israel. We shall now attempt to reconstruct the various stages through which our mythical material has passed. Gunkel (p. 59) has correctly observed that what we have here is only a torso. The original myth must have been longer, relating the background of the love adventures of the bene elohim. Probably in the first stage this Canaanite myth related how these young gods, the physical offspring of the older generation of dieties, discovered one day looking down from their mountain the women of the earth. They entered into relation with them, but soon discovered that the mortal women do not suit them. They grow old and ugly. The point of the original myth was probably aetiological in character, explaining the presence of giants as stemming from this mixture of the divine with mortal women.

In the second stage the myth entered Israel's tradition. The mutilation of the myth occurred probably when the myth was still in oral transmission. The highly mythical character was offensive to the religion of Israel, but because this old material had lodged itself deep in Israel's tradition, it took a long period of assimilation to render it harmless. This assimilation took place first of all by shortening and repressing many of the more offensive elements while maintaining its aetiological character. Still, while in this oral stage, the myth was subordinated to Yahweh. This was done in v. 3 by

a polemical note against the old mythical tradition. V. 3 came most probably after v. 4, that is in the second stage the verses were in the succession 1. 2. 4. 3. The polemic is strangely enough directed only against the new generation and not against the guilty young gods. That this was a difficult process of assimilation we see from the ambiguity of the הָאָדָם in v. 3. Originally then, the "Gottesurteil", coming at the end of v. 4, was a rejection of the claim of this new generation to immortality. When we reflect as to what circle in Israel at this early time would have been responsible for such a polemic against this mythical material, it seems most natural to think of the early nebi'im. It was here that the interest in the ruah of Yahweh was especially active. The claim of the myth that the divine spirit could be transmitted on a material-physical plane met its real opposition in these circles. By relating the ruah alone to Yahweh (יְהוָה), they expressed their conviction that this ruah remained solely a supernatural possession of Yahweh which he could at any time withdraw.

In the third stage the material was finally reworked by the Yahwist to fit into his history. In the first place, the placing of the judgment of Yahweh contained in v. 3 before v. 4 goes back most probably to his hand. Thereby, he broke the causal relationship between the presence of giants and the illicit relationship of the bene elohim, reducing the mythical element in the tradition. Giants do not stem from a mixture of divinity with mortals. This change in position of v. 3 has a profound effect on its whole interpretation. Where originally the הָאָדָם were the נְפִלִים, receiving the judgment of God, through its present position after v. 2, the הָאָדָם come to signify mankind in general as in vv. 1 and 2. Whether by this new order the Yahwist

intended the 120 years to be a limit to individual life or a period of grace is no longer clear. Most probably he intended it first as a limit of life. But in its present position as an introduction to the flood, one cannot help from seeing some connection here with a period of grace before the coming catastrophe. The story serves as an example for 6, 5 of the terrible conditions before the flood. Overlooking the contradiction that mankind in general be punished for the sin of the bene elohim, the Yahwist found this material suitable to illustrate further the increasing sinfulness of man before God and built it into his history. The great difficulties which remain in the text show clearly this long history of transmission, and that even in the final stage the oly mythical "Vorlage" was still only partially digested.

That many unanswered questions remain in the text is also witnessed to by the elaborate attempts of the late Jewish writers to fill in the gaps.[10] Already in I Enoch (6, 1ff) the idea of the fallen angels was developed in an elaborate manner. The cause of the evil in the world was attributed to this fall. The fallen angels introduced magic, astrology, and science to man (7, 8, 69). If the lack of punishment for the young gods was felt in Gen. 6, 1-4, this is made up for in I Enoch (10, 4f. 11f; 14, 5; 16, 1-4 etc.). As is to be expected in the development of angelogogy, also the fallen angels were given elaborate functions and names (6, 7; 8, 1ff). The same motifs are found furthermore in the Book of Jubilees (4, 22; 5, 1ff) where all ill and sickness is attributed to these angels. Finally, echoes of this same tradition are clearly evident in the New Testament (Jude 6; 2 Peter 2, 4, etc.).

The fact that such highly mythological material, so offensive to the religion of Israel, could have entered their tradition points to its very ancient

entrance within Israel. Moreover, the long history of assimilation before its reworking by the Yahwist goes to substantiate our position. It seems also the most reasonable assumption that the home of this mythical material was in Canaan. That similar traditions were prevelant in Phoenicia, has long been supposed from an obscure fragment from Philo of Byblos taken allegedly from Sanchuniathon.[11] At the end of his theogony, following the birth of Aion and Protogonos, there is reference to Bamemrumos and Usoos who called themselves after their mother "because the women of that time commingled unhindered with those they happened upon". This evidence is strengthened by the Ras Shamra texts. Such a myth as "Enki and Ninhursag"[12] gives abundant evidence of the promiscuity in sexual relations of the gods, although not offering an exact parallel to our text.

CHAPTER V. AN EXEGESIS OF GENESIS 6,5-9,17

I. An Examination of the Two Sources J and P

A. There is almost unanimous agreement among critical scholarship as to the divisions between the Yahwist and Priestly sources in the flood traditions. Only small differences separate, for example, the division of Budde, Holzinger, Gunkel, and Simpson.[1] We shall use the following division as a basis for our study, indicating any controversial points as we proceed:
J- 6,5-8...7,1-5.10.7.16b.12.17b.22.23* 8,6a.2b.3a...6b-12.13b.20-22;
P- 6,9-22.7,6.11.13-16a.17a.18-21.24. 8,1.2a.3b-5.13a.14-19.9,1-17.

B. An understanding of the two sources can best be had by treating each separately and then together.

J: Yahweh regrets having made man, and decides to destroy him because of his wickedness. Noah, however, retains favor. (a break in which most probably the appearing of Yahweh to Noah with instructions for the ark occurs) Yahweh commands Noah to enter the ark with his family, taking with him of all the creatures seven pairs of unclean,[1a] and a pair of the clean, since a flood is coming. After seven days, with the beginning of the rain, Noah and his family enter the ark and Yahweh closes the door. The rain lasts forty days and nights, covering the earth and drowning its inhabitants. Then the rain is stopped and the water subsides. By letting out a dove[2] three times, Noah determines when the land is dry. He sacrifices to Yahweh a burnt offering. Yahweh smells the offering and promises no more to destroy the earth through a flood.

P: Noah was a pious man in a corrupt world. God informs him of the destruction of all flesh because of wickedness. Exact instructions for building

a boat are given Noah. He is to take in the boat from all the creatures a pair, along with his family and provision. Exact chronology is given of the age of Noah and the date of the flood. The flood is caused by the opening of the waters from above and below the earth. On the same day, Noah and family enter with the animals. The waters increase 150 days, covering the mountains and killing all life. Then God remembers Noah and the animals and through a wind the waters subside. Noah is commanded to leave the ark by God after 1 year and 11 days from the beginning of the flood. God blesses Noah, and gives him the new world's order. A covenant is established with Noah with the rainbow as its sign.

It is evident from this synopsis that two continuous flood traditions are present. While some of J has been discarded by the redactor, P has been entirely retained. The two traditions follow, by and large, the same general pattern: 1) the flood as a judgment, 2) only Noah is informed, 3) the building of a ship, 4) the collecting of the animals, 5) the destruction of all life, 6) the blessings of Noah. In spite of this general agreement, the differences between the traditions are of significance.

1) In J's account the piety of Noah can only be assumed from the context. The main emphasis is on the wisdom of Noah, a motif which fails by P. In P, however, Noah has become the symbol of piety. 2) In J Noah is only informed of the flood following the construction of the ark. In P he is informed immediately of its purpose. 3) In J Noah is to take seven pairs of the clean animals, and a pair of unclean. P has Noah take only one pair of all animals. 4) J has no exact chronology either of Noah's age or of the beginning of the flood. 5) The cause and the nature of the flood is different in both

accounts. In J it is a forty day and night rain; in P the waters stored under and above the earth are let loose. In P the increase of the water for 150 days is recorded. Naturally the ending of the flood is correspondingly different. 6) Only in P does the ark land on a mountain. 7) In J Noah by the use of birds, determines when the ground is dry. In P God gives the command when to disembark. 8) The length of the flood is different in J and P. According to J, the flood lasts 40 + (7) + 7 + 7 days. According to P, it lasts 1 year and 11 days.[3]

Following the investigation of the extra-Biblical sources, we shall return to our comparison of J and P, attempting to determine the relation and age of these two traditions.

II. An Examination of the Extra-Biblical Flood Traditions

A. The Sources

1. The Sumerian account[4]
2. The Old Babylonian fragments[5]
3. The Assyrian accounts[6]
4. The account of Berossos[7]
5. Other flood accounts, excluding the Near East[8]

B. The Relation of the Near Eastern Traditions to One Another

A comparison of the Gilgamesh Epic XI with the flood tradition of the Sumerians[9] makes it evident that the Gilgamesh Epic goes back to the same tradition. In both accounts we have 1) the decision of the gods in an assembly to destroy mankind (S. line 144c; G. E. line 14f), 2) the indirect communication through a wall to one man of the coming flood (S. 51f; G. E. 20ff), 3) the saving of the animals (S. presupposed in 211 and 260; G. E. 27) in a large boat, 4) a sacrifice to the gods (S. 211; G. E. 155f), 5) the immortalizing of the hero (S. 257-8; G. E. 193f). But the great differences between

the two accounts vitiate against any idea of a literary dependence. In the Sumerian version, Ziusudra is the last of the pre-diluvian kings; in the G. E. there is no connection with history, but the flood tradition has been inserted into the larger epic poem. It is told in the first person to Gilgamesh and builds actually part of a highly reflected aetiology concerning man's immortality.

Moreover, a comparison of the G. E. with the various fragments of the flood myth from the Babylonian and Assyrian sources make it evident that a variety of traditions were circulating in Babylon. In the old Babylonian fragment of the Atrahasis myth (cf. Note 5) a much fuller account for the reason of the flood is given than in the G. E. The flood is seen as the last in a series of plagues. In the DT 42 fragment, Atrahasis asks for a floor plan of the ship, an element which is missing in the G. E. as well as in the Hilprecht fragment. Also DT 42 gives a much fuller account in the context of its initial building of those who are to enter the ark than the G. E. In spite of the fact that these fragments point to various traditions, their close similarity is also witnessed to. So, for example, the words of Ea in the fragment "B" of the Atrahasis myth is almost identical to lines 21ff of the G. E.

Finally, when we examine Berossos, it is evident that his account does not rest entirely on any one of the earlier sources.[10] Naturally, the similarity is greatest with the G. E. Xisuthros is to give a similar answer as Utnapishtim when asked where he is going in his boat. This element may well have been present in the lost portion of the Sumerian account. But the reference to the birds in Berossos and the G. E. has no place in the Sumerian account. Berossos and the G. E. have also the reference to a mountain in common, although Berossos locates it in Armenia, in the Kordyaean mountains,

over against the G. E. site of Mount Nisir, most probably in the vicinity of the Lower Zab.[11] On the other hand, the personal names preserved in Berossos return to the Sumerian tradition. Also the mention of Xisuthros as the last of the primeval kings is from the Sumerian tradition. The reference to the buried writings might also well be of Sumerian origin.

To summarize the results: we can say that the literary evidence witnesses to a tradition taken over from the Sumerians by the Babylonians and transmitted in varying forms during the Babylonian-Assyrian period. In spite of the varying forms, the traditions retained their close similarity.

C. The Archaeological Evidence as to the Origin of these Traditions.

Berossos ends his list of the ten primeval kings with the notice: "nach dem Tode des Otiartes, dessen Sohn Xisuthros Regierung 18 Saren. Unter diesem sei gewesen die grosse Sintflut".[12] This tradition preserved by Berossos of a flood separating history into a pre-diluvian and post-diluvian age has been confirmed by the cuneiform evidence.[13] Ziusudra, king of Shuruppak, is the last of the primeval kings before the coming of the flood. How are we to account for this flood tradition which has become such an important dividing line in the early Sumerian attempts at historical writing?

There have been various attempts made from the side of archaeology to produce evidence of a historical flood from which event the Sumerian and Biblical accounts are witnesses. In an article[14] concerning the excavations at Ur, Woolley describes a layer of clean clay of a thickness of 3,70 m. to 2,70 m. on top of which was the evidence of a pure Sumerian civilization, and below which was a mix culture. On the basis of this evidence Woolley goes so far as to state: "Wenn wir alle diese Tatsachen in Erwaegung zogen,

so konnte kein Zweifel sein, dass die Flut...eben die Flut der sumerischen Geschichte und Sage war, die Sintflut, auf der die Geschichte von Noah beruht."[15] Shortly thereafter S. Langdon announced that evidence of the flood had been found at Kish.

From the very beginning, there have been serious objections to these theories of the flood.[15a] Already Ch. Watelin[16], director of the Kish excavation, had objected to the identification of Langdon with the decisive argument that figures of Gilgamesh, who was to have learned of the flood from Utnapishtim, were found in the bed below the flood clay. Furthermore, Boehmer[17] attacked Woolley for his most unscientific approach and subjectivity of judgment. Finally, recent archaeological diggings at Fara, Lagash, and Uruk have uncovered many similar clay strata indicating undoubtedly an inundation; however, the periods of this strata vary tremendously and can in no possible manner have been caused by one flood. Parrot[18], in a summary of the archaeological evidence, indicates clearly that the flood strata of Ur belongs to the Obeid period while that of Kish to the Early Dynastic.

We can conclude our discussion of the archaeological evidence by stating that only signs of local floods are evidenced. That the Sumerian flood account reflects a local flood is quite probable (cf. below), but any closer attempt to determine its source from archaeology is impossible. We are forced in our investigation into the field of comparative religion and mythology for further light on the flood traditions of the Near East.

D. The Flood as a Problem of Ethnology and Comparative Religion

The myth of the flood is very widespread among the peoples of the world. We have tried to show in the above paragraph, however, that this

phenomenon cannot be explained by supposing some world-wide historical flood, the memory of which is preserved in these different forms. Moreover, the very fact that the flood myth is not universally present, but fails to occur in very definite areas of the world, raises a number of questions. Finally, the evidence that many of the flood stories have been borrowed and are not independent myths, demands an investigation both in the field of ethnology and comparative religion.

We shall consider first the problem of the areas in which the flood myth occurs, and then the historical relationship between these myths. The flood myths have been collected in a thorough manner by Andrae[19], but these have been supplemented and critically examined by Winternitz.[20] Beside the well known myths of the Sumerians, Babylonians, Greeks, Indians, and Persians, the many examples in primitive cultures have also been thoroughly examined. Among the primitives, the flood myths appear chiefly in America, Australia, and in the islands of the Pacific Ocean. The myth fails completely in Africa, occurs only infrequently in Europe, and is also unknown in large areas of Asia. In his classification, Winternitz has been careful to separate those flood accounts which cannot be considered as mythical since they rest either on actual historical events or are aetiological legends.

In order to determine whether a historical dependency is present or not, Winternitz chose nine characteristic motifs for his basis of comparison:[21] 1) the enclosable ark, 2) the taking of the "seeds of life", 3) the sending out of birds or something similar, 4) the sacrifice, 5) the rainbow, 6) the ethical motif, 7) the saving of a hero, 8) the foretelling of the event, 9) the renewal

of mankind. The first five he considers most characteristic. On the basis of substantial agreement in these motifs, he reaches the conclusion that the Greek, Indian, and Persian accounts are dependent on the Semitic account. This conclusion of Winternitz is especially interesting since he has successfully refuted the thesis of Usener[22] that the Greek and Indian myths stem from independent sources. Moreover, a large percentage of the myths among the primitive peoples are to be explained through the influence of Christian missionaries notwithstanding the tremendous differences in the local development of the tradition.

If this be the case in regard to the spread of the myth, we are next faced with the need of explaining the source of this flood myth. Usener[23], on the basis of Greek, Indian and Babylonian myths, has attempted to show an astral mythology as forming the basis for the flood mythology in general. According to him, the flood is a poetic elaboration of the basic theme in which the "God of Light" passes through the flood and is carried up to the gods from where he later descends to form a new race of men. Recently this thesis has been revived by Kraeling.[24] He finds traces of this motif in Berossos' account as well as in the G. E. in which, following the immortalizing of the hero, he "sails" to the land of the gods. Winternitz[25], however, fails to find evidence to support this astral mythological approach in the primitive religions. He admits its validity only in relation to the Babylonian account.

Moreover, Wundt[26] has criticized the attempt to derive all flood mythology from one source. He admits that the idea of the half-moon as a boat in the sky as well as other mythical connections with the heavenly trip of the departed soul certainly exercised an influence in the development of the

flood mythology. But to derive all flood mythology from this one source is one-sided and false. It does not explain either the legendary (sagenhaft) character reflected in most flood stories nor the fact that often a people with an astral mythology (i. e. the Egyptian) lack a flood myth.

Winternitz has also emphasized the significance of this fact that the flood stories do not appear in areas where rain and local floods never occur. "Die meisten Flutsagen sind durchaus local gefaerbt." (p. 333) This can best be explained by supposing that the myth rest on a powerful impression caused by an experience witnessed in nature. We have in fact many flood stories which show this first stage toward the forming of a flood myth. To this original impression are added then various mythical elements. It is easy to see how the scheme of "Weltuntergang und Welterneurung" could be assimilated to the flood mythology. The old world age comes to an end. One man, or a pair, is saved and joins the gods. From there he descends to become the father of the new generation. Traces of the "Weltuntergangs" myth in the G. E. are evidenced when the gods are also frightened by the deluge: "they ascend to the heaven of Anu, the gods cowered like dogs". We see that this motif of "Goetterdämmerung" can also be assimilated within the flood mythology. Boehmer[27] has pointed out that in the Genesis account traces are evidenced in an earlier "Vorlage" of the "Weltuntergangs" myth in which the earth and not just man was destroyed.

In summarizing, we can say that the flood mythology has its origin in the terrifying impressions caused by rain storms or local floods. To these original experiences from nature are added legendary and mythological elements stemming largely from local tradition and poetic phantasie. The great variety within the flood mythology points to the capacity of this material for

elaboration and imagination.

III. The Relation of the Biblical Tradition to the Near Eastern

A. We shall first attempt a comparison of the Biblical accounts J and P with the Gilgamesh Epic.

1. Similarity in Content

a) The decision of Yahweh (the gods) to send a flood in which only Noah (Utnapishtim) is informed (J 6, 7-8; P 6, 13. 17; G. E. XI lines 14. 19-31).

b) Noah (Utnap.) receives orders to make a ship (P 6, 14; G. E. 24). The ship is to have a roof (P 6, 16; G. E. 31), decks and divisions (P 6, 14-16; G. E. 60-62), a door (P 6, 16; G. E. 88. 93), and pitched (P 6, 14; G. E. 65). J's account of the ark is missing, but there is a reference to a hatch. (J 8, 13; G. E. 135).

c) Noah (Utnap.) is to take aboard animals (J 7, 2; P 6, 19-20; G. E. 85).

d) Noah (Utnap.) is obedient (P 6, 22; G. E. 33-34).

e) The entrance of Noah (Utnap.) into the ark (J 7, 10. 7; P 7, 11. 13; G. E. 92). The door is closed (J 7, 16b; G. E. 93).

f) The description of the flood (J 7, 12 rainstorm; P 7, 11 "Urflut"; G. E. 89-91 rainstorm; 96 ff. cosmic distrubances). The whole land is covered (P 7, 18-20; G. E. 134). The people outside the boat die (J 7, 22-3; P 7, 21; G. E 133).

g) The end of the flood is described (J 8, 2b. 3a; P 8, 2a; G. E. 131).

h) The boat lands on a mountain (P 8, 4; G. E. 140).

i) Bird(s) are sent out to see if the land is dry (J? 8, 7 raven; J 8, 8f dove three times; G. E. 145-154 dove, swallow, raven).

j) Noah (Utnap.) sacrifices (J 8, 20; G. E. 155f). Yahweh (the gods) smell(s) the savor and is (are) pleased (J 8, 21; G. E. 159f).

k) Noah (Utnap.) is blessed (P 9, 1; G. E. 192f).

l)- A sign is given that the flood not be forgotten (P 9, 13f; G. E. 164).

2. The Differences in Content

a) The cause of the flood in Genesis is the wickedness of man (J 6, 5; P 6, 13). In the G. E. the cause is uncertain (G. E. 13).

b) Noah is directly informed of the flood (J 7, 1-4; P 6, 13. 17). Utnapishtim learns the information only indirectly (G. E. 9. 187).

c) The length and form of the ships is different (P 6, 15-16; G. E. 55f).

d) Utnapishtim stores his possession, gold and silver, in the ark (80f). This fails in both the Biblical accounts.

e) The length of the flood is different (J 8, 6a. 2b; P 8, 3b; G. E. 126).

f) The name of the mountain is Ararat in P(8, 4), Nisir in G. E. (140).

g) Noah sends out one bird three times (J 8, 8f). Utnap. sends three different birds (145f).

h) The form of the blessing is different (P 9, 1f; G. E. 190f).

i) The sign given is different (P 9, 13f; G. E. 164).

3. A Comparison in Language

In 1885 Kosters[28] made a linguistic comparison of the flood account of the G. E. with the Biblical accounts and reached the conclusion that the agreement was so close that the Yahwist account was directly borrowed from a literary source. This conclusion has been subjected to a thorough investigation by J. Schoneveld.[29] As to the alleged literary dependence, the following can be said:

a) Often the agreement is due to the common subject matter. So the parallelism between the verbs יצא and asu (Gen. 8, 16-19; G. E. 155) is to be explained by the common action of leaving the ark.

b) Often the agreements rest on general Semitic syntax. The similarity between Gen. 6, 22 and G. E. 33, 34 cannot be understood as proof of a literary dependency. It is a common form of expression in Hebrew.

c) An agreement can rest on a stereotype phrase which has become a technical term in the cult. This is well the case in Gen. 8, 21a and G. E. 159-160 with the phrase וַיָּרַח יְהוָה אֶת־רֵיחַ הַנִּיחֹחַ. The two accounts share a common anthropomorphic idea which has entered the technical vocabulary of the sacrifice. It is not proof of literary dependence.

d) The linguistic agreement is often only partial. cf. Gen. 8, 2 וַיִּכָּלֵא הַגֶּשֶׁם and G. E. 131 imhullu abubu ikla. The verb agrees, while the subject is different.

e) Very often the idea is the same, but the vocabulary it totally different. Moreover, this is often the case when parallel words were available. cf. Gen. 6, 14 תַּעֲשֶׂה אֶת־הַתֵּבָה and G. E. 24

bini (isu)elippa. One would expect תבל in a literary dependency.

We can conclude our comparison of the Biblical accounts with the flood account of G. E. in respect to content and language. The marked similarity in content among the accounts remove all doubt that the Biblical accounts are dependent on the G. E. The disagreement, however, in content as well as the evidence from our linguistic study witness against a direct literary dependence. We have here a dependence on a common tradition.

B. This conclusion is substantiated by a comparison of the Biblical accounts with the other fragments of the Near Eastern flood tradition. At times, the Biblical accounts are closer to these other traditions than to the G. E. The role of Noah in the Biblical accounts as the primeval Patriarch shows more similarity to the Sumerian King Ziusudra than to that of Utnapishtim in the G. E. The humility and piety of Ziusudra (AOT^2 p. 198, 22; AENT p. 44, 147) parallels that of Noah (P 6, 9). Moreover, the motive for the flood which plays a large role in the Biblical accounts, but which is missing in the G. E., is found in the Atrahasis myth. (AOT^2 p. 201f.; AENT p. 105 "A") The scanty evidence of these fragments makes a further comparison impossible. However, the evidence is enough to point to a common tradition, rather than one literary source as the basis of the Biblical accounts.

IV. The Nature and Transmission of the Flood Traditions in Israel

A. We have first to approach the question concerning the relation of the two accounts, J and P. Do we have here two different "Vorlagen" or just one? The answer of Holzinger to this question is representative of the older literary criticism: "Die Abweichungen von P entstammen also nicht einer

andern Vorlage, sondern sind geistiges Eigentum von P" (p. 86). Certainly a great many of the divergencies of P can be reckoned to his priestly theology. The pious type of Noah, the exact description of the ark, the chronology, the failure of a sacrifice, the covenant, and the new order following the flood are elements which are explained best from the particular bias of the writer.

There are many elements in P which do not fit easily into this category but seem rather to rest on an ancient "Vorlage". Especially, Gunkel (p. 155f) has demonstrated the older elements in P's account. The description of the flood as a return of the chaos 7, 11 in poetic from is certainly no creation of priestly imagination. Similarly, the proverb in 9, 6 concerning the shedding of blood is ancient tradition. Moreover, the end of the primeval peace and the myth of the rainbow both witness to an independent "Vorlage" over against J. In regard to the latter, Gressmann[30] has pointed out that the expression "his bow" indicates that this bow was characteristic of Yahweh. He sees in this myth originally a connection with the creation myth since, in the Enuma elish following the end of the battle with the chaos dragon, the bow of Marduk is placed in the heavens (AOT^2 p. 123). It would seem that this independent myth was only secondarily joined with that of the flood. It is interesting to note in the Gilg. Epic XI 165ff. that there is also an oath following the flood, but the sign is a necklace of Ishtar rather than the bow. The myth of the bow occurs often in primitive religions where the bow even becomes a demon-like being.[32] In the Babylonian religion it is usually Ishtar who is pictured with the bow.[32]

We can conclude by saying that it is rather unlikely that this priestly "Vorlage" stems from a later influx of Babylonian tradition. The nature of

this ancient material as well as its connection with Gen. 1 would rather point to a similar transmission with a priestly school. However, in the later Jewish writers the influx of new mythical material is most probable.[33] So especially in II Enoch 33, 10f and the Books of Adam and Eve 50, 1f we see that the mention of the "writings" which are to be taken along occurs (cf. Berossus AOT^2 p. 201). Gressman even sees a reference to the assumption of Noah in I Enoch 89, 9, but this is not at all certain.

B. The attempt to determine when the mythical material entered Israel's tradition poses a problem similar to that of Gen. 1. Because of the complete silence of the Old Testament in regard to the flood tradition until the exilic period (Ez. 14, 14. 20; Jes. 54, 9), the claim has been once again made that the tradition entered Israel at a late period.[34] The same arguments, however, as we brought forth in Gen. 1 against this one-sided literary criticism, can once again be used. We can conclude as before that it is most likely that these traditions were brought from Northern Mesopotamia by the Hebrew ancestors before the middle of the second Millennium. The localization of the mountain at Ararat, which is most probably the district of Armenia lying north east of Lake Van, in contrast to the more southerly location of Mt. Nisir in the G. E. would also indicate the mediation of the Hebrew tradition from Northern Mesopotamia. The transferring of the location by Berossus to a mountain further away indicates the advance in geographical knowledge by his time.

C. The manner in which this old mythical material has been reworked by the Biblical writers is also of interest. Both J and P relate the cause of the flood to the wickedness of man, and so place it in the ethical sphere rather

than in the arbitrary decision of the gods. In the Babylonian account the ethical moment is not completely lacking (cf. e.g. the weeping of Utnapishtim at the destruction of all life XI, 135f), but because of the crude polytheism it is made ineffective. Utnapishtim's salvation is seen more as a result of his own cleverness and friendship of Ea than the grace of the gods. In the Yahwist account Noah is only informed after the building of the ark of its purpose, and so he interprets the building as a test of faith. P interprets the flood as a return of the primeval chaos and the end of the old age. Both J and P have broken the cyclical thinking of the "Weltuntergang-Welterneuerung" myth. The ethical motivation comes out also in 8, 1(P). The animals are seen as more than just things, but as God's creatures they are the object of mercy and are to be saved from the flood. The difference in the idea of the sacrifice is also evident. The Babylonian account remains very crudely polytheistic with the gods swarming as flies about the sacrifice. The Yahwist, although retaining the old language, sees the sacrifice as an expression of Noah's thanksgiving in which Yahweh remains completely free over against the offering. Moreover, according to J (8, 21), there is no new world following the flood since man is still essentially evil. This becomes another chapter in his mounting history of sin. According to P, there is a new age, but not a return to the primeval age. Rather, a new age with a different order begins in the history of God with man. Finally, it should be noticed that the Biblical writers have not taken over either of the names of the Babylonian heroes (Ziusudra or Utnapishtim); rather, the Yahwist has joined the flood story with a Canaanite[35] figure attributed with the discovery of the vineyard. (9, 18ff).

CHAPTER VI. AN EXEGESIS OF GENESIS 11,1-9

I. The Problem of Sources

The story is set in the primeval times when mankind spoke one language. As men (conceived of as nomads) migrated from the east they discovered the broad plain of Shinar and settled there. Then they discovered how to make bricks, and the idea came to them of using them to build a city and a lofty tower which was to gain them renown and serve as a center. Yahweh came down to see what they were doing, and expressed fear that this would be just the beginning of their activity. He counselled together and decided to confuse their language. Due to the resulting confusion, the tower was left unfinished,[1] which was then named Babel.

The problem of sources within this passage became actually a subject of controversy following Gunkel's attempt to find two continuous sources here. Before this Budde, Dillmann, and Holzinger, while noticing certain friction had found the story a unity. Gunkel found the following indices for two sources: 1) vv. 5 and 7 assume several trips back and forth between heaven and earth, which is unlikely, 2) there is a double purpose for the building in v. 4b and 4c, 3) 8a and 8b are not easily joined, since 8b is obvious when following 8a, 4) several other smaller difficulties and doublets are present. Gunkel then attempts to unravel a "city-version" and a "tower-version".[2]

Undoubtedly, Gunkel has rendered a service by pointing out clearly the internal difficulties, but the commentators have been divided in their acceptance. Skinner is very reserved while, nevertheless, leaning to Gunkel's position. However, he shows some of the weaknesses in Gunkel's two source theory, for example, that v. 8a and v. 9b produce a very awkward conclusion

to the "tower-version" (p. 224). Only by supposing that a word-play from the verb פוץ has fallen out in the editing is it at all bearable. Procksch (p. 89) accepts the two sources, but then maintains their unity "trotz verschiedener Pointen. . besonders wegen der klaren Siebener". His attempt to reconcile vv. 5 and 7 by supposing first a descent half-way down and then the full distance is too harmonistic in character.

A basic criticism against Gunkel is made by W. Staerk.[3] He admits openly that the passage is not a unified whole, but has a double point, confusion in the speech and a dispersion motif. But he rightly objects against the attempt to solve the difficulty along the lines of literary criticism. The difficulties have entered in during its oral transmission, but because the tradition has organically grown, it is a mistake to attempt a mechanical division on the literary plane. Staerk criticizes Gunkel for inconsistency since he, of all scholars, should have recognized the failure of the literary method. That Staerk's criticism is still relevant, is shown by the renewed attempt of Simpson[4] at a literary solution. While not admitting two continuous sources, he tries by a theory of "redactional overworking and glossing" to overcome the difficulties. He has hardly succeeded. Finally, both Eissfeldt[5] and Pedersen[6] are agreed in assigning the passage to one source.

II. Mythical Elements in Gen. 11, 1-9

The story begins in the primeval time when the whole world had only one language (v. 1). It is hardly necessary to point out that this tradition does not fit with that of Gen. 10 where the differences among tribes and languages is derived from Noah's three sons. We have here clearly an independent

tradition which has later put into its present sequence. V. 2 נָסְעוּ בְּ is better rendered "from the east" than "eastward" (cf. Jubilees 10, 19). The verb נסע retains here its primary idea of a verb of departure ("to pluck up tent pegs") and is followed more naturally by a determination of the starting-point than of the goal. (cf. Skinner). The word בִּקְעָה denotes the flat land in opposition to the mountains as in Deut. 8, 7; 11, 11; Is. 40, 4 etc. By Shinar is meant not just the southern part of Mesopotamia as the Babylonians used it, but the whole area from Bagdad to the Gulf.[7] In v. 3 we have related the discovery of bricks. The word לְבֵנָה is a borrowed word from the Accadian libintu. It is understandable the tremendous importance the discovery of the brick had for the Babylonian culture. In the Enuma elish (VI, 40ff. AOT^2 103f.) Marduk makes the first brick mould. (cf. Herodotus I, 179). V. 3 retains the naive idea that the name "brick" was known before the thing itself. It is told from the standpoint of people used to building in stone. In v. 4 the presence of a city and a tower points to a combination typical of an oral tradition. The actual story turns about the building of a tower, the etymological aetiology, however, about the city (v. 9). These are simply joined in its oral transmission. The antique idea of a "tower with its top in the heavens" is common for the Near East. For example, in the report of the reconstruction of the temple by Nabopolassar, we read: "sein Haupt mit dem Himmel wetteifern zu lassen."[8]

The goal of these men "to make a name" (שֵׁם) for themselves (v. 4b) is the ὕβρις which initiates the actual story. As Pedersen[9] has clearly seen "the name is the very peculiarity and power of the soul" (italics mine). It is not here a matter of increasing their reputation, but their actual

strength grows through such an action. They will not be scattered in that they use this newly obtained strength to hold together. Before it is too late, Yahweh also recognizes the danger. He comes down to see the city and the tower (v. 5). This presupposes that only by descending could Yahweh know what was actually happening. In v. 7 we have a "Goetterversammlung". Stade[10] was the first to recognize clearly the mythical background of this story. If it had been originally Yahweh acting in v. 5, one would not have expected him to return for consultation. Moreover, there is the additional difficulty that in v. 7 (וְנֵרְדָה) the return of Yahweh from his visit in v. 5 is not mentioned. We have here originally a polytheistic story of a divine messenger reporting back to the gods, and suggesting a common action on their part: "let us go down". This interpretation is confirmed by the rest of the story. In v. 6 Yahweh expresses fear over the plans of the men: "This is only the beginning of what they will do; and nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible for them." Even the attempt to storm the gates of heaven itself becomes now a dread. This is clearly the same mythical motif of "Goetterneid" which we discovered in 3, 22 and 6, 1-4. (cf. this motif in Homer, Iliad VII, 448ff).

Yahweh acts by diffusing their language. Through this division man's strength is dissipated and now the gods have nothing to fear. Aetiologies explaining the existence of the various languages are also common in the history of religion. Frazer[11] gives various examples from primitive religions where a unified speech is destroyed in the primeval time by some event. The naive idea contained is that the diversity among peoples is derived from the diversity of language, rather than the reverse opinion of modern science.[12] In Greek mythology there are dim traces of legend ascribing the diversity of

language as a punishment of the gods, which is recorded in its Roman version in the 143 fable of Hyginus. In Gen. the aetiological character of the myth has been retained. Mankind once spoke one language, but because of a transgression in the "Urzeit" in which man tried to overstep his limits, the gods instituted the confusion.

Finally, the etymological aetiology in v. 9, namely the derivation of the name Babel, is closely combined with the aetiology of the confusion of language. The word Babel goes back to the Accadian Bab-ili= gate of god(s).[13] The name is probably derived from בָּלַל a form not found in Hebrew, but stemming from the Aramaic.[14]

III. The Problem of the "Tower of Babel"

A. It has long been recognized by Old Testament scholars that behind the mythical account of the tower of Babel was reflected historical impressions from the ancient world. For a long time, however, the chief source for a description of Babylon's temple- tower was the brief account of Herodotus.[15] But with the opening up of the Near East, new light has been thrown on the whole question. The lack of knowledge concerning the tower of Babylon led to the supposition among many scholars that the original Biblical and Greek tradition went back to some other temple-tower, usually taken as that in Borsippa. This story then was transferred later to the more well-known city of Babylon. This hypothesis was supported by the fact that the temple-tower at Borsippa remained a long time in unfinished state. Even comparatively recently, Kraeling[16] has revived this theory. However, with the excavations at Babylon, along with the cuneiform descriptions of the temple-tower,[17]

the theory of Borsippa has become impossible.

Modern archaelogical research discovered very soon that the temple-tower or ziggurat was a characteristic building in Babylonia. Parrot[18] indicates in his recent inventory 33 examples of the ziggurat (including its earlier predecessors) in 26 different towns. Moreover, on the basis of the archaeological evidence chiefly since 1920, there has been an increasing agreement among archaeologists as to the history of the developments of the ziggurat.[19] Starting with the proto-historical period at Eridu and Uruk the temple-towers show at first a mere platform on which the temple rests. Already in the latest examples of the proto-historical towers, for example at Uqair, a decided development toward architectural union of the tower with the temple is evidenced. In the last stage of the Old Sumerian period, namely at Akshak, the tendency to separate the whole temple-tower from its surroundings by a wall gave to the whole an increasing character of the sacred. The ziggurat of Ur[20] (III Dyn.) shows clearly this union which, however, reached its supreme form in the tower of Babylon (Neo-Babylonian period).[21]

The earlier history of this temple-tower is still unknown, certainly since the time of Hammurabi it must have played a leading role in Babylon. The literary record is chiefly concerned with its repair which presupposes a long history. During the Assyrian domination, the tower was often destroyed, and rebuilt again by Nabopolassar and Nebuchadnezzar II. Alexander the Great, when purposing a reconstruction, had the tower completely leveled.

B. To the problem of the religious significance of the ziggurat, there has been little agreement found among scholars.[22] The older view that the ziggurat was a representation of a mountain,[23] brought from the mountainous

homeland of the Sumerians to Babylon, has been shown as only a secondary motif by recent investigation. Busink (p. 14ff) has demonstrated from Eridu that the original ziggurat had nothing to do with a mountain. However, in that the Babylonians later on compared the ziggurat to a mountain, this may well be at the best a secondary motif acquired during its later development. Then again, Dombart's attempt[24] to find in the ziggurat a throne concept has found little acceptance. Andrae[25] advanced in 1927 the view that the temple-tower must be seen as a unity, the former being the dwelling place of the god, the latter his place of appearing. But in 1939[26] he retracted this view in favor of one in which the temple-tower provided the holy place for the resting of the divine spirit. Both Schott[27] and Vincent [28]have defended the idea that the tower was the entrance door through which the god passed to the lower temple. Lenzen,[29] however, has attacked this theory, defending that the primary significance is that of an altar. Finally, Busink[30] concludes that a development must have taken place in the long history of the ziggurat as to its meaning. He feels that originally perhaps the practical necessity of protecting the temple against flood and plundering was primary, but admits also that religious motives must have played an important role in its development.

IV. The Nature and Origin of the Tradition in Israel

A. The Tower of Babel tradition differs from that of the creation account (Gen. 1) or the flood story in that we have no parallels in Babylonian literature. Moreover, upon an examination of the material in this tradition, it is very unlikely that a Babylonian account will be found. For it is expecially significant for this account that it evidences more than one source of origin.

We shall attempt therefore to separate the two elements within the account. First of all, to the Babylonian material can be reckoned the scene of action on the great Babylonian plain. Moreover, that Babylon was considered the oldest city in the world is also an idea going back surely to Babylonian tradition. Already in Enuma elish (VI, p. 37ff, AOT^2 p. 122f) the building of Babylon, city of Marduk, occurs following the creation of the world. Berossus has the building of the city immediately following the flood (AOT^{2}201). Furthermore, the knowledge of the huge city as the center of the known world for trade and commerce goes back to Babylonian tradition. Finally, the name of the city, Babel, and the fact of a temple-tower exhibit a genuine Babylonian source.

But a different standpoint reveals itself in other elements. We find it in the description of the building material. The word for brick לִבֵּנָה libintu is obviously a borrowed Accadian word. Whereas one would expect the corresponding Babylonian word for morter כֹּפֶר found in Gen. 6, 14, only the West-Semitic word חֵמָר occurs. Furthermore, although the Babylonian word Babel-Babilu is retained, it is connected with an Aramaic root which interprets it in a completely different light. No longer does it refer to the city, but to the tower and then no longer as a temple to the honor of the gods, but as something anti-godly reaching up into the heavens.. This idea is then developed by relating its destruction to divine intervention. Finally, the idea of the confusion of languages in Babylon is a tradition not native but rather hostile to Babylon.

The key to this tradition is found in the word בָּלַל. It points to the fact that the Babylonian material is seen through the eyes of an outsider who misunderstands the religious significance of the ziggurat. To the wan-

dering Aramean visiting the world's center, Babylon, the temple-tower personified the pride and defiance of man against the gods. Moreover, the mixture of language in this metropolis certainly left its impression. Perhaps we can conceive of the process of formulation in the following manner: An older tradition concerning the confusion of speech through the intervention of gods was known by the Aramean travellers. We have already seen that such aetiologies are common. This tradition was then localized in Babylon and filled with Babylonian material. Instead of Babel as the "gate of god(s)", the Aramean spoke rather of the "place of confusion". Through this play on words a connection was made between an older mythical tradition concerning the confusion of languages and the tower of Babel. In this way, the vivid impression of the temple-tower as an anti-godly spectacle provided ideal material to illustrate an older myth about the confusion of language.

B. The very nature of this tradition points to its popular character over against other examples which we have seen of a sacred tradition. It owes its origin most likely to Aramean traders in Babylon who then passed on the myth from land to land. The story presupposes a period when Babylon was at its height of power. Albright[31] suggests the period between the 18-15 century B. C., but it can hardly be dated with any accuracy.

We have pointed out that the story was originally polytheistic in nature. Undoubtedly, the most offensive elements were eliminated in Israel which still in its oral stage. The Yahwist has worked this old story into his history as the final chapter of man's rebellion against God. The older "Vorlage" of polytheism and "Guetterneid" remains in places visible. But in its present position the story works as a climax to the theme starting in Gen. 3, 22 develop-

ing in 6, 1-4, and reaching its end in 11, 1-9. When we review the primeval history in Gen., we see here the increasing gap between God and man illustrated on the basis of older mythical traditions. Through the "Tower of Babel" story, the Yahwist witnesses to his conviction that with the break of man from God, this last unity of men to one another in language also is lost.

Finally, a word should be said as to the later use of this tradition.[32] In the 3 Book of the Sibylline (97ff) the story occurs with strange new motifs. The destruction of the tower is caused by a mighty wind. Following thereupon, it is then joined with the Greek mythology concerning the battle of the Titans. Alexander Polyhistor[33] continues in this same line of development attributing, however, the collapse of the tower to the attack of the gods. It would seem most probable that these new motifs are to be attributed not just to an elaboration of the older material, but to the definite influx of new mythical material, a portion of which can be traced to Greece.

Footnotes to Chapter I

1. C. Hartlich, W. Sachs, Der Ursprung des Mythosbegriffes in der modernen Bibelwissenschaft (1952).

2. Hartlich-Sachs, ibid., p. 11ff.

3. H. W. Bartsch (Herausg.), Kerygma und Mythos^2(1951), p. 22.

4. Hartlich-Sachs, ibid., p. 148.

5. W. Wundt, Voelkerpsychologie^2 V, p. 31ff.

6. Gunkel, Genesis^4, p. XIV; cf. RGG^{2}IV, p. 363f.

7. The summary account of this complex problem is meant in no way to obscure the difficulty of the subject. Due to the nature of our investigation, we are forced to draw some general lines, and then to refer to the important literature for those wishing a more detailed study of the problem. cf. E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture^6(1920)I, p. 273ff; W. Wundt, ibid., esp. IV, p. 3ff and V, VI; P. Ehrenreich, Die allgemeine Mythologie(1910), p. 59ff; L. Lévy-Bruhl, La Mentalité Primitive (1Ed. 1922; 14 Ed. 1947) p. 17ff; J. W. Hauer, Die Religionen (1923), p. 340ff; Lévy-Bruhl, La Mythologie Primitive(1935); H. Frankfort, The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man(1948); C. Kerényi, Introduction to a Science of Mythology (1951); E. Buess, Geschichte des mythischen Erkennens (1953), p. 106ff.

8. Hauer, ibid., p. 340ff.

9. cf. Wundt, ibid. IV, p. 60ff.

10. For a discussion of the problem of how the idea of gods developed: Tyler, ibid, p. 288ff; Wundt, ibid., VI, p. 1ff; N. Soderblom, Das Werden des Gottesglaubens (1916), p. 114ff; R. Otto, Gott u. Gottheiten der Arier (1932)p. 16ff; G. van der Leeuw, Phaenomenologie (1933) I Teil, (1-21).

11. Kerényi, ibid, p. 7; Ad. E. Jensen, Mythos und Kult bei Naturvoelkern (1950), p. 87f; M. Eliade, Images et Symboles (1952), p. 73f.

12. The relation of the myth to the cult is extremely complex. The problem problem was formulated clearly by W. Robertson Smith, Die Religion der Semiten (1899), p. 13ff; cf. the further discussion in Wundt, ibid., V. p. 20ff; Hooke (ed), Myth and Ritual (1933); Hooke, Labyrinth (1935); G. van der Leeuw, Phänomenologie (1933); p. 389ff; 424ff; W. F. Otto, Dionysos, Mythos u. Kultus (1933); and the warning of C. Kluckhohn against the tendency to oversimplify the problem, Harvard Theol. Review 35 (1942), p. 45ff.

Footnotes to Chapter II

1. F. Delitzsch, Neuer Commentar ueber die Genesis[5] (1887), p. 49f.

2. J. Skinner, Genesis[2], (1930), p. 13.

3. W. F. Albright, "Contributions to Biblical Archaeology and Philology", J. B. L. XLIII, p. 364.

4. O. Procksch, Die Genesis[2/3] (1924), p. 440.

5. K. Budde, "Wortlaut u. Werden der ersten Schoepfungsgeschichte", ZAW 35, p. 69

6. F. Lukas, Die Grundbegriffe in den Kosmogonien der alten Voelker (1893); W. Foerster, ThWzNT III, p. 1000.

7. J. M. P. Smith, "The Syntax and Meaning of Gen. 1, 1-3", AJSL, XLIV, p. 108f; cf. also Budde, op. cit., p. 69. Galling, Ztsch. Th. u. K. 47, 149ff: "das תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ statuiert die vorzeitliche Zustaendlichkeit dessen, was spaeter Erde war."

8. so Albright, op. cit., p. 366; also Caspari, "Tohuwabohu", MVAG, 1917 accepted by Procksch, p. 441.

9. cf. for fuller discussion L. Waterman, "Cosmogonic Affinities in Gen. 1, 2", AJSL 43, 177f.

10. A. Heidel, The Babylonian Genesis (1951) presents arguments which carry little weight against Gunkel. For example, to argue (p. 104f) that because Rahab in Is. 30, 7 occurs as a designation for the Egyptian Crocodile, we can assume the same meaning, in Is. 51, 9, is hardly convincing.

11. The belief that the world came out of darkness is common to the mythology of Babylon, Egypt, India, Greece, Phoenicia. (cf. Wilhelm, Ztsch. fuer Missionskunde u. Religionswissenschaft XXI, 49; Richard Larsch, "Die Finsternisse in der Mythologie und im relig. Brauch der Voelker," ARW, III, p. 124f.; S. Aalen, Die Begriffe 'Licht' und 'Finsternis'(1951).

12. J. P. Peters, "The Wind of God", JBL, 30, 44f; Albright JBL, 43, 363f; May, "The Creation of Light In Gen. 1, 3-5", JBL, 58, p. 203-4; Galling, "Der Character der Chaosschilderung in Gen. 1, 2", Zsch. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 47, p. 145ff; W. H. McClellan, "The Meaning of ruah Elohim in in Gen. 1, 2", Biblica, 1934, p. 517f.

13. H. Gunkel, Genesis[4], p. 104. Cf. Ps. 104, 30 where a similar idea occurs; the ideas are, however, not identical since in this passage the spirit succeeds in the creative activity.

14. Ibid.

15. Galling, op. cit., p. 152.

16. T. J. Meek, The Bible, An American Translation. This translation is supported by Peters, May, Galling and von Rad.

17. J. Powis Smith, "The Use of Divine Names as Superlatives", AJSL 45, 212ff.

18. so Albright, JBL 43, p. 363; May, op. cit. 203-204; Galling, op. cit. Peters, op. cit., p. 46; Von Rad, Das erste Buch Mose, loc. cit.

19. L. Koehler, Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros.

19a. K. Th. Preuss, Religion und Mythologie der Uitoto (1921) I, 166ff.

19b. L. Duerr, Die Wertung des goettlichen Wortes im A. T. und im antiken Orient, (1938), p. 22ff.

19c. Eichrodt, Theologie des A. T. II (1935), p. 35; O. Procksch, ThWBzNT IV, p. 99; Zimmerli, I Mose I, p. 43ff.

20. For the mythical concept of "mother-earth": A. Dieterich, Mutter Erde, ein Versuch ueber Volksreligion^3, 1925; T. Noeldeke, "Mutter-Erde und Verwandtes bei den Semiten", ARW 8, 161-166; E. Dhorme, "La Terre-mère chez les Assyrians", ARW 8, 550-552. L. Koehler, "Biblische Spuren des Glaubens an die Mutter Erde?" ZNW IX, 77-80; G. Van der Leeuw, Phaenomenologie der Religion (1933), p. 73f.

21a. cf. Gunkel, Genesis, p. 105; P. Ehrenreich, Die allgemeine Mythologie und ihre ethnologischen Grundlagen (1910) p. 113; K. Th. Preuss, Geistige Kultur der Naturvoelker (1914) p. 13.

21. Paul Humbert, "Das fuenfte Schoepfungswerk", ZAW, 35, p. 135.

22. Carl Keller, Das Wort Oth, (1946), s. 127.

23. Keller, op. cit. s. 81f; Bertholet u. Lehmann, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte^4, I, 503f.

24. A. O. T.^{2}, p. 123.

25. Keller, op. cit., p. 129-30.

26. 'nt: III:37 - Albright defends a connection between ug. ltn. (Lotan) und Leviathan in BASOR 46, 19^{18}.

Footnotes to Chapter II

27. cf. besides the various Old Testament theologies: Hehn, Festschrift Eduard Sachau, (1915) p. 36ff. W. Caspari, Reinhold Seeberg Festschrift I, 1929, 197f; J. Hempel, Ztsch. f. Syst. Theol. (1932) p. 211ff; P. Humbert, Études sur le Récit du Paradis et de la chute dans la Genèse, p. 153ff. (1940): G. von Rad. ThWzNT II 387ff. L. Koehler, "Die Grundstelle der Imago Dei", Th Z. 4, p. 17ff.

28. cf. especially the thorough analysis of Koehler and Humbert.

29. Ancient Near Eastern Texts (ed. Pritchard), p. 74.

30. Ibid., p. 108

31. Pritchard, AENT (1950), p. 38.

32. E. Abegg, Der Messiasglaube in Indien u. Iran (1928), p. 6-7.

33. cited from H. Lietzmann, Der Weltheiland (1909), p. 3.

34. H. L. Strack and P. Billerbeck, Kommentar zum N. T. aus Talmud und Midrasch (1928) IV, 2 Teil, P. 964f.

35. The sources for the Babylonian creation tradition are as follows: 1) an extract from Berossus (3 cent. B.C.) by Alexander Polyhistor used by Eusebius. cf. P. Schnabel, Berossus und die Babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur (1923), numbers 12-14 p. 254-6. 2) A passage from Damascius (6 cent. AD) 3) Enuma Elish 4) Various cuneiform fragments and references in occasional magical texts. (cf. AOT^2)

36. S. N. Kramer, Sumerian Mythology (1944), p. 37f.

37. The sources for the Phoenician cosmogony preserved in Greek recensions are as follows: 1) Eusebius Praep. Evang. 1, 10 gives account of the cosmogony of Sanchuniathon taken from Philo Byblios. 2) Damascius Damascii philos. de prim. princ. cap. 125 preserved a version from Eudemos and one from Mochos.
cf. Lukas, op. cit.; Carl Clemen, Die Phoenikische Religion nach Philo von Byblos (1939) and the review by Baumgartner, ThLZ 1939, 442ff.

38. cf. W. Baumgartner, Theol. Rund. NF 13, p. 162f.; Humbert AfO XI 235; Albright, JBL, 58, p. 93f. G. Seippel, Der Typhonmythos (1939), p. 17f, 40f.

Footnotes to Chapter III

1. K. Budde, Die biblische Urgeschichte(1883), p. 245; also in Die biblische Paradiesesgeschichte (1932), s. 85f.

2. H. Gunkel, Genesis[4], p. 25f.

3. R. Smend, Die Erzaehlung des Hexateuch (1912) divides as follows:
   J1: 2, 4b. 9abα ; 3, 18. 19b. 21. 22. 24
   J2: 2, 9bβ -25; 3, 1-17, 19a. 20. 23.

4. O. Eissfeldt, Hexateuch-Synopse (1922): L- 2, 4b. 5ac. 7-9. 6. 16. 25; 3, 1-17a. 18a. 19ac. 22. 24; J-2, 5bd. 7*. 10-15. 18-24;3, 17b. 18b. 19b. 23. 24 .

5. J. Meinhold, "Die Erzaehlungen vom Paradies und Suendenfall", B. Z. A. W. 34 (1920), p. 122f:
   1) 3, 22-24b
   2) J1-2, 5aα bα . 7-9. 6. 16f. 24; 3, 1-17a. 17b α . 18a α . 19a. (19b) 21. (24a); 4, 1;3, 20
   3) J2- 2(5a β b β), 10-14. 15. 18-24; 3, 17b-24*.

6. Gunkel, op. cit., p. 27.

7. H. Gressmann, "Mythische Reste in der Paradieserzaehlung", A. R. W. 10 (1907), p. 356.

8. Gressmann, "Die Paradiessage", Festgabe A. v. Harnack (1921), p. 28.

8a. W. Staerk, "Zur alttestamentlichen Literarkritik", ZAW 42 (1924) p. 34ff.

9. H. Schmidt, Die Erzählung von P. und Suendenfall (1931) p. 4f, 13f, 31f .

10. J. Begrich, "Die Paradieserzaehlung" ZAW (1932), p. 93f.

11. chief source: Gen. 2, 4b. 5*. 6*. 7. 8. 16. 17*. 18-25; 3, 1-17. 19a. b(21) 23. 24*; secondary source: 2, 5*. 9. 15; 3. 18. 19c. 22. 24*.

12. P. Humbert, Études sur le récit du Paradis et de la chute dans la Genèse (1940).

13. For example, Humbert attempts to reconcile the discrepancy between v. 5 and v. 6 (the dry land and the 'ed) in the following way:" les v. 5 et 6 ne sont pas un véritable doublet, car il y a contraste voulu entre agents naturels, normaux et constants (la pluie et l'homme) et agents surnaturels et exceptionels (Dieu qui se sert de la terre détrempée par le êd pour créer, par un acte initial extraordinaire, l'homme et la végétation)" p. 12. But the actual problem is here overlooked. V. 6 with its tenses expresses a condition, not "un acte initial". It is a similar problem to Gen. 1, 2c.

Footnotes to Chapter III

14. J. Wellhausen, Prolegomena[4] (1886) p. 312.

14a. cf. AENT p. 38. 60f. Further examples found in Gunkel Genesis, p. 5.

15. E. Sachsse, ZAW (39) 1921, p. 276-283.

16. A. Schultz, ZAW (49) 1931, p. 147.

17. cf. Th. C. Vriezen, Onderzoek naar de paradijsvoorstelling der oude semitische Volken (1937), p. 127f for an extensive bibliography.

18. S. R. Driver, G. B. Gray, The Book of Job (1921) translate it as "mist", p. 282. Budde: Das Buch Hiob[2] (1913): "Mit אד ist der Regen noch nicht im Niederfallen, sondern als aufgespeicherte Masse gedacht, sein erster Behaelter der אד (Gen. 2, 6), der sich fernerhin zu Wolken ballt. "p. 233.

19. H. Schmidt, op. cit., p. 37; cf. Budde's criticism in Christ. Welt 1932, p. 207.

20. Albright, JBL 38, p. 102-3; 57, p. 231; 58, p. 102.

21. Holzinger, H. Genesis (1898), p. 24.

22. Budde, Die biblische Paradiesgeschichte (1932), p. 8f.

23. Gunkel, Genesis, p. 28.

24. cf. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 130f for the various attempts at derivation. L. Koehler Lexicon (already in his Theologie, p. 239) holds that האדם-אדם is the actual and not just a popular etymology. From Arabic two roots have been suggested: أدم man; أدم "Haut" (Bauer ZDMG 71, p. 413, Note 2).

25. F. M. Th. Boehl, Genesis I (1923), p. 65.

26. E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture[4] I, (1903), p. 430f, and G. van der Leeuw, Phaenomenologie (1933), s. 257f.

27. J. Hehn, "Zum Problem des Geistes im Alten Orient u. im A. T." ZAW (43) 1925, s. 213.

28. Hehn, ibid. p. 213.

29. Hehn, ibid, p. 216.

30. Gressmann, ARW (10) 1907, p. 365f.

Footnotes to Chapter III

31. L. Koehler, Theologie des A. T. (1936), p. 239.

32. so Schwally, ARW (9) 1906, p. 170; cf. E. Reinach, "La Naissance d'Eve", RHR 78 (1918), p. 185-206.

33. cf. Gunkel, op. cit. p. 12 for parallels.

34. J. Hempel, Zeitschrift fuer syst. Theologie 1932, p. 223.

34a. cf. Hermann Tuerck, Pandora u. Eva (1931)

35. A. Brock-Utne, Der Gottesgarten (1936), and the review by W. Staerk, Theol. Blaetter (1937), p. 114. The attempt of Brock-Utne to derive all the features of the "Gottesgarten" from the local-color of the Palestine garden is one-sided as we shall try to illustrate.

36. Vriezen, op. cit. p. 62f.

37. Vriezen, ibid. p. 120f. Gordon Ugaritic Handbook p. 256 divides 'dn into three different roots: 1) "season" (cf. Acc. addanu), 2) "plain" (cf. Acc. edinnu), 3) several other different words. The connection of עדן to any of these is very questionable.

38. The attempt is often made to find in the task of work (2, 15) a contradiction to 3, 17f where work is only a result of the curse. While a certain friction cannot be denied, Koehler's interpretation (Theologie p. 135) seems the most satisfactory: "Die Strafe des Mannes besteht in der Muehsal seiner Arbeit". (Italics mine)

39. Pritchard, AENT, p. 96. Whether a tree of life ever appears in Babylonian religion, is questionable.

40. We have in the Sumerian GIS-TI a "tree of life", but no accompany-myth is present. The decisive text is C. T. XVI p. 46, 183ff. translated in ACT^2 p. 328f. cf. the following literature for further treatment: Wuensche, Die Sagen vom Lebensbaum und Lebenswasser (1905), p. 2; Albright, AJSL (35), 1919, p. 163; Langdon JRAS 1928, p. 843ff.; Ebeling and Meissner, Reallexikon der Assyriologie, II, (1933) p. 468; Vriezen, op. cit. p. 52; D. van Buren Orientalia 13 (1944)p. 281ff.

41. A. Erman, Die Religion der Aegypter (1934), p. 215.

42. W. Kirfel, Die Kosmographie der Inder (1920), p. 41, 44.

43. Uno Holmberg, Der Baum des Lebens (1922), p. 51f.

Footnotes to Chapter III

44. cf. Vriezen op. cit., p. 142 for a bibliography of the various treatments up to 1937. Furthermore, Humbert, op. cit., p. 82f; J. Coppens, De Kennis van goed en kwaad in het paradijsverhaal (1944); A. Kolping, Alttest. Studien Noetscher (1950), p. 137f.

45. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 144.

46. Skinner, Genesis, p. 75.

47. Humbert, op. cit., p. 92.

48. Budde, Paradiesesgeschichte, p. 49.

49. Coppens, op. cit., p. 18 first proposed his new translation in Ephem. Theolog. Lovanienses (1943), "Ecce Adam quasi unus ex nobis factus est,": Zie de mensch, zooals eenieder die uit hem zal voortkomen, zal goed en kwaad moeten leeren kennen, d. i. leeren ervaren en ondergaan." This translation has tremendous grammatical difficulties to overcome, as Coppens himself admits. The place of הָאָדָם כְּאַחַד מִמֶּנּוּ between הִנֵּה and לָדַעַת would never allow the combination "moet leeren Kennen". When Coppens then proposes to drop כְּאַחַד מִמֶּנּוּ as a gloss (p. 19), then he is himself admitting the impossibility of his translation.

50. Compare finally the interpretation of L. Kessler, "Welche Deutung fordert die Geschichte vom Suendenfall ihrem Zusammenhang nach?" ZAW 35 (1915), p. 26ff: "Das Wort nimmt Gott wieder auf, nicht ohne erhabene Ironie. Ja, der Mensch ist wie unsereiner geworden in Erkenntnis des Guten und Boesen, aber in der Weise, dass er, wie ihm dies angekuendet worden, zugleich vom ewigen Leben ausgeschlossen, zugleich dem Tode verfallen ist, und doch auch wiederum so, dass sich, eben auf Grund der Gottgleichheit, daran ein Kampf schliesst zwischen ihm und der Schlange." (p. 29)

51. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 145: "goed en kwaad-alles; niet goed en kwaad-niemendal".

52. Humbert, op. cit., p. 92, "L'arbe du connaître bien et mal... pourrait donc être rendu en bref par 'l'arbre du Savoir'".

53. Coppens, op. cit., p. 27: "De antithese 'goed en kwaad'..drukken in de Heilige Schrift..een totaliteit uit."

Footnotes to Chapter III

54. so Gressmann, ARW (1907), p. 345f and Festgabe Harnack, p. 27f; Gunkel. Genesis, p. 29; Albert, ZAW (33) 1913, p. 175f.; Schmidt, H. op. cit., p. 33; R. Gordis, "The significance of the paradise myth", AJSL 42 (1936) p. 86f. Against this thesis the following arguments can be brought:

1) Already in 2, 23f we have certainly included the idea of sexual knowledge, in fact, it presents the aetiology of the sexual relationship. It might, however, be objected that this story is from a different tradition as the paradise myth in ch. 3. Be that as it may, 2, 25, which is a connecting verse over to the paradise myth and most probably inserted by the Yahwist, does not equate insensitivity to nackedness with lack of sexual knowledge.

2) Furthermore, as Humbert points out (p. 98) the word ערם nowhere appears in the O. T. (with the exception of 2 times in the Song of Solomon) with an exclusive sexual significance.

3) Yahwe confirms (3, 22) that man has become as the elohim through his knowledge. It is quite impossible that the Yahwist conceived of this similarity being sexual knowledge.

55. I. Kant, Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte, in Kant's gesammelte Schriften (heraus. K. Preuss. Akademie der Wiss., VIII, Berlin, 1912, p. 109f) cited by Coppens, op. cit., p. 10; J. Wellhausen, Prolegomena[4], 300f.

56. Budde, Urgeschichte, p. 69f. cf. Skinner's criticism of Budde's position op. cit., p. 96.

57. Gunkel, Genesis, p. 10 for parallels in the fairy tale literature.

58. cf. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 148f for the various attempts at an exact geographic localization.

59. Gressmann, ARW 10 (1907) p. 347.

60. G. Hoelscher, Drei Erdkarten (1949) p. 35ff. has the four rivers all flowing from north to south which is hardly correct.

61. For an understanding of the antique world-picture, compare: Grosser Historischer Weltatlas, herausgegeben vom Bayrischen Schulbuch-Verlag, I Vorgeschichte und Altertum (1953), Tafel 8d, and the Erlaueterungen I, 2. Aufl. 1954, p. 58f.

Footnotes to Chapter III

62. cf. Wuensche, op. cit., p. 71f; Holmberg op. cit. p. 70f.

63. Kirfel, op. cit., p. 39f.

64. Holmberg, op. cit., p. 71.

65. Gressmann - Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums[3] (1926), p. 284.

66. Zimmern, KAT[3], p. 529.

67. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 177f.

68. Baudissin, W. W., Studien zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte, I (1876) p. 287f; Adonis und Esmun (1911), p. 325f.

69. P. Toscanne, "Etudes sur le serpent", Memoires Delegation en Perse, (1911), p. 153ff. (The evidence is of Susa, but significant nevertheless for Palestine.) H. Vincent, "Le baal cananéen de Beisan et sa paredre", Rev. Bibl. 1928, p. 512-543; W. F. Albright, BASOR 31 (1928-9), p. 1-11; S. A. Cook, The Religion of ancient Palestine in the light of Archaeology, (1930), p. 98; K. Galling, Bibl. Real. Lex. (1935) under "Schlange". Albright, "Astarte Plagues and Figurines from Tell Beit Mirsim", Mélanges René Dussaud, (1939) part 1, p. 107-120.

70. Gressmann, Festgabe Harnack, p. 32f.

71. A. Jeremias, ATAO[4] (1930), p. 106. interprets the expression as symbolic with the meaning of "verflucht sein". He quotes from a passage in the Amarna Texts: "Es hoere der Koenig auf die Worte seiner treuen Diener und gebe Geschenk an seine Diener, waehrend unsere Feinde zuschauen und Staub essen".

72. J. Hehn, Festschrift Merkle (1922), p. 146.

73. Fichtner, ThWBzNT, V. p. 572.

74. Pritchard, AENT, p. 96.

75. Ibid., p. 102.

76. J. Feldmann, Paradies und Suendenfall (1913), p. 320f.

77. Hesiod, Works and Days, 1. 108f.

78. H. Th. Obbink, "The Tree of Life in Eden", ZAW (46) 1928, p. 105f.

79. Budde, ZAW (47), p. 55f.

Footnotes to Chapter III

80. Hesiod, Theogony, l. 565f.

81. M. Lidzbarski, Ephemeris fuer semitische Ephigraphik I (1902) p. 26f.

82. Gressmann, ARW, 1907 (10), p. 359f.

83. Albright, AJSL (36) 1920, p. 284.

84. H. Bauer, ZDMG, (71) 1917, p. 413

85. I. Eitan, JAOS, (49) 1929, p. 30f.

86. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 193.

87. Gressmann, op. cit., ARW, p. 358f.

88. Rhodokanakis, ZAW 39 (1921), p. 76f.

89. P. Dhorme and L. H. Vincent, "Le Nom des Chérubins", R. B. 35 (1926), p. 328ff., 481ff.

90. Thureau-Dangin, "Le glaive tournoyant", Rev. d'hist, et de litt. rel. I, 1896, p. 147f, quoted by Dhorme-Vincent, p. 482.

91. Albright, AJSL 36, p. 282f.

91a. J. Pokorny, Irische Volksmaerchen (1923), p. 56ff.

91b. R. M. Meyer, Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte (1910), p. 199.

92. cf. this motif in Hesiod, Works and Days 117f.; Ovid, Met. I, 102 etc.

93. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 116.

93a. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 22 for the literature up to 1937.

94. S. N. Kramer, Sumerian Mythology (1944) 54ff.; BASOR, SS I, (1945); AENT, p. 36f (1950). cf. F. Schmidtke, "Urgeschichte der Welt im sumerischen Mythus", Alttest. Studien Noetscher (1950) p. 205ff, esp. p. 213.

95. Vriezen, op. cit., p. 47 from E. Chiera, Sumerian Religious Texts (1924).

96. Vriezen, op. cit. p. 7. The chief passage is from the old Babylonian version of the Gilgamesh epic, AENT, p. 90: "Gilgamesh, whither rovest thou? the life thou pursuest thou shalt not find. When the gods created mankind, death for mankind they set aside, life in their own hands retaining".

Footnotes to Chapter III

96a. cf. AOB^2 603; Vriezen, op. cit., p. 67f.

97. Toscanne, op. cit., p. 179f.

98. Hehn, Festschrift Merkle (1922), p. 141f.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

1. Beside the treatment in the various commentaries, the following literature is important:
   K. Budde, Die biblische Urgeschichte (1883), p. 1ff.
   O. Gruppe, Philologus, 47 (1889) p. 92ff, 328ff.
   O. Gruppe, ZAW 9 (1889) p. 135ff.
   J. Wellhausen, Composition des Hexateuchs,[3] (1889), p. 307f.
   F. Schwally, ZAW, 18 (1898) p. 142ff.
   J. W. Rothstein, BZAW 34 (1920), p. 150ff.
   A. Junker, Biblica 16 (1935), p. 209ff.
   Closen, Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici (1937) (unavailable).
   E. Kraeling, JNES 6 (1947) p. 193-208.
   J. Fischer, Alttestamentliche Studien F. Noetscher (1950) p. 74ff.

1a. E. Meyer, Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstaemme (1906), p. 212f.

2. cf. Dillmann, Genesis,[6] p. 119f for the history of the older exegesis. Rothstein, op. cit., while admitting a mythological content in the original fragment, sees in Gen. 6, 1-4 the work of the priestly redactor who wished to polemize against mixed marriages in the postexilic age. But he fails to answer the above objections against the "ethical" interpretation. Rothstein argues for a non-mythological meaning of bene elohim since it occurs "in keiner vorexilischen Schrift" (p. 155). But it is impossible to understand a passage as Job 38, 7 with the parallel to the stars, without supposing here a very ancient tradition as basis. The more recent attempts of Junker and Closen to defend the ethical theory, when in various modifications, is answered convincingly by Fischer, op. cit.

3. cf. K. Kerényi, Die Mythologie der Griechen (1951), p. 137ff (the love adventures of Apollo), p. 172 (the adventures of Pan). C. Gordon, Ugaritic Literature (1949), p. 60f.

4. Cf. Gruppe, Philologus op. cit., p. 104f for reasons against the "time limit" theory. Also Skinner p. 145 who sees the difficulties, but tries to make a compromise: "it would be unwise to press the antagonism of the two clauses".

5. cf. Dillmann, op. cit., p. 133; and especially Kraeling, op. cit., p. 200.

6. Gruppe, Philologus, op. cit., p. 100ff.

7. compare with Hesiod, Works and Days, line 108f.

8. Kraeling, op. cit., p. 201.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

9. The older derivation from נפל "the fallen (from heaven)" is improbable. Delitzsch Genesis (1887), p. 152 suggests "Fehlgeburt" (cf. נפל). "נפילים bed. wie, 'Fallkind' = Bastard die Gefallenen als widernatuerlich Erzeugte." So auch Koehler Lexicon. C. Cornill's emendation of נפלים to נפלים in Ez. 32, 27 (Das Buch des Propheten Ezechiel (1886) p. 390) is no longer generally accepted. Biblia Heb.^{3} has dropped it over against the 1913 edition. Also Bertholet, Hesekiel (1936), loc. cit. and Jahnow, Das hebraische Leichenlied (1923) p. 234 have not accepted it.

10. cf. Gressmann-Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums (1926), p. 332ff; A. Lods, "La chute des anges", Rev. d'Hist. et. Phil. Rel. 7 (1927) p. 295ff.

11. Text and translation in Clemen, Die phoenikische Religion nach Philo von Byblos (1939), p. 21-22; cf. Eissfeldt, Ras Schamra und Sanchunjaton (1939), p. 64f for discussion of this fragment and derivation of the names Usoos and Sammemrumos.

12. Pritchard, AENT, p. 39f.

Footnotes to Chapter V

1. K. Budde, Urgeschichte, p. 276, J: 6, 5. 6. 7*8... 7, 1. 2. 3b. 4. 5. 10. 7*. 16b. 12. 17b. 22*. 23*. 8, 6a. 2b. 3a... 6b. 7. 8*. 9-12. 13b... 20-22.. P: 6, 9-22. (13*) 7, 6. 11. 13-16a. 17a*. 18-21. 22a*. 24. 8, 1. 2a. 3b-5. 13a. 14-19. 9, 1-17. 28f.

   H. Holzinger, Genesis, s. XXV, J: 6, 5-8. 7, 1f. 3b-5... (8f. *)10. 7*. 16b. 12. 17b. 22f*. 8, 6a. 2b. 3a... 6b-12. 13b... 20. 21a α b 22. 9, 18a. 19. P: 6, 9-22. 7, 6. 11. 13-16a. 17a*. 18-21 (24?). 8, 1a. 2a. 1b. (3b?). 4f. 13a. 14-19. 9, 1-3. 8-17. 28f.

   H. Gunkel, Genesis, p. 59, p. 137. J: 6, 5-8,.. 7, 1. 2. 3b. 4. 5. 10. 7*. 16b. 12. 17b. 23a α . 22. 23b. 8, 6a. 2b. 3a... 6b. 7-12. 13b... 20-22. P: 6, 9-22. 7, 6. 11. 13-16a. 17a. 18-21. 24. 8, 1. 2a. 3b. 4. 5. 13a. 14-19. 9, 1-17. 28. 29.

   C. A. Simpson, The Early Traditions of Israel (1948) p. 62. J: 6, 5-8, 7, 1-5. 7. 10. 12. 16b. 17b. 8, 2b. 3a. 6-12. 13b. 20-22. no analysis of P.

1a. The phrase אִישׁ וְאִשְׁתּוֹ indicates that שִׁבְעָה שִׁבְעָה is to be translated "seven pairs".

2. The sending of the birds (8, 6f) presents various problems. The raven (v. 7) does not suit with the sending of the dove. In the first place, it has no place in the general context. Why send out a raven to find out if the land is dry when the raven is not dependent on dry land to exist? Secondly, the raven destroys the climax built up with the successive tries of the dove. Procksch, Genesis$^{2/3}$ (p. 474) assigns the raven to P, but this is very improbable. Gunkel's proposal of another text recension is more satisfactory. Dahse (ZAW 28 (1908) p. 5-7) finds evidence in various codices of the LXX of an earlier recension. Kraeling (JBL 66 (1947) p. 286f) finds here a trace of a J1 flood story which he tries to reconstruct over against J2.

3. The chronology of P presents a number of difficult problems. cf. Holzinger, p. 76f; Skinner p. 167f; Procksch p. 474-5. It seems logical to suppose that the M. T. with its flood chronology of 1 year 11 days was reckoning by a moon year. 354 days + 11 = 365 or a sun year. (The LXX has the flood lasting one year, but supposes a sun year of 365 days). But with this assumption of a moon year, the other data in the flood does not harmonize. On the 17 day of the 7 month-that is, after 5 months-the ark rests on the mountain. According to the moon reckoning this is the 147-148 day. The M. T. gives, however, the data of 150. Most likely we have here vestiges from an older system of chronology. Skinner suggests that the 150 days were calculated independently of the calendar.

Footnotes to Chapter V

4. First published by A. Poebel, Museum of the University of Pennsylvania: Publications of the Babylonian section. V(1914), No. 1; IV, 1, p. 9-70. AENT p. 43-44, AOT^2 198f.

5. 1) Fragment from the Atrahasis myth, designated "A" in AENT p. 104f. AOT^2, p. 201f.
   2) Fragment from the Atrahasis myth, designated "B" in AENT p. 105. AOT^2, p. 202f.
   3) Fragment, designated "X" in AENT p. 105, the so-called "Hilprecht fragment", H. V. Hilprecht, Der neue Fund zur Sintgeschichte (1910). AOT^2 p. 199.
   4) Fragment "D", AENT p. 105-6, AOT^{2}203ff.

6. 1) The Gilgamesh Epic, Tablet XI, 1-196; AENT p. 93-93; AOT^2, 175ff.
   2) Fragment DT 42, designated "C" in AENT p. 105; AOT^2, p. 200.

7. P. Schnabel, Berossos (1923) p. 264f; AOT^2 p. 200-1.

8. Here a distinction has to be made between those accounts which show influence from the Near Eastern tradition, and the indigenous flood traditions. This problem is discussed under subheading II D. The Greek flood traditions are handled by H. Usener, Die Sintfluthsagen (1899) p. 31ff. cf. also R. Andree, Die Flutsagen (1891); M. Winternitz, Die Flutsagen des Alterthums und der Naturvoelker (1901); G. Gerland, Der Mythus von der Sintflut (1912).

9. It was once thought that Nippur 4561 (AENT p. 38 f. "Enki and Ninhursag) contained a source for the Sumerian flood tradition. cf. S. Landersdorfer, Die Sumerischen Parallelen zur Biblischen Urgeschichte (1917) p. 97ff. Kramer's new translation makes it evident, however, that this text has nothing to do with the flood myth.

10. cf. A. Ungnad- H. Gressmann, Das Gilgamesh-Epos (1911) p. 213-216.

11. E. A. Speiser identifies Mount Nisir with the modern Pir Omar Gudran. (AASOR VIII (1926/7) p. 17-18. Kraeling suggests (JAOS 67, 1947, p. 181) that the localizing of the mountain in Armenia by Berossos rests on a better geographical knowledge of the later age which realized that there were higher mountains than Mt. Nisir (9,000 ft.) and that the flood might not have wiped out the Urartaeans or Medes at this height.

12. Schnabel, op. cit., p. 262.
    Regarding the name Otiartes: [illegible] and then Ubartutu, the father of Utnapishtim (Gilg. Epic XI 23), and king before the flood. AOT^2 148, l. 33; 149, l 15f.

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13. The two significant texts are the Sumerian King List of W. B. 444 and W. B. 62 published by S. Langdon Oxford Edition of Cuneiform Texts (1923) pl. I-IV, pp. 8-21. cf. especially Jacobsen, Th. The Sumerian King List (1939), AOT[2] 147ff. ANET 265f.

14. L. Woolley, Antiquaries Journal IX (1929) p. 329.

15. L. Woolley, Ur und die Sintflut[5] (1931) p. 20.

15a. cf. for a good summary: John Bright, "Has archaeology found evidence of the flood?", The Biblical Archaeologist Vol. V, No. 4 (1942), p. 55ff.

16. Ch. Watelin and Langdon, Excavations at Kish IV, p. 40-44, quoted by Parrot, Déluge et Arche de Noé (1952) p. 32.

17. J. Boehmer, ZAW (1932) p. 119-121.

18. Parrot, op. cit., p. 35-36.

19. Andree, cf. footnote 8.

20. M. Winternitz, op. cit.

21. Winternitz, op. cit., p. 325.

22. Usener, op. cit., p. 239ff.

23. Usener, op. cit., p. 115, 138ff, 239ff.

24. Kraeling, JAOS 67, p. 179.

25. Winternitz, op. cit., p. 332.

26. W. Wundt, Voelkerpsychologie,[2] VI (1915) p. 292ff.

27. Boehmer, op. cit., p. 117f.

28. W. H. Kosters: "De Bijbelsche Zondvloedverhalen met de Babylonische vergeleken", Th. T. XIX (1885), p. 161-179, 321-346, quoted by J. Schoneveld, De Oorsprong van het Bijbelsche Zondvloedverhaal, Diss. Leiden (1938) p. 68.

29. Schoneveld, op. cit., p. 68-77.

30. Gressmann, The Tower of Babel (1928) p. 31f.

Footnotes to Chapter V

31. Tylor, Primitive Culture I, p. 265f. 269.

32. H. Prinz, Altorientalische Symbolik (1915) p. 143.

33. Gressmann-Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums, p. 492f.

34. cf. Schoneveld, p. 81ff. for a detailed treatment and refutuation of the various attempts at a late dating of this tradition in Israel.

35. There is also the chance that the name Noah may be Amorite, going back to the form "Nāḥ", cf. Theo Bauer, Die Ostkanaanaar (1926) p. 35f.

Footnotes to Chapter VI

1. Gressmann, The Tower of Babel (1928) p. 3 defends the theory that the tower did not offend the gods, but was actually completed in the story. This is quite an indefensible position.

2. To the "city-version" belongs: vv. 1. 3a. 4a $\alpha\gamma$. 6a α . 7. 8b. 9a.
To the "town-version" belongs: vv. 2. 3b. 4a $\beta\delta$ 5. 6a β . 8a. 9b.

3. W. Staerk, ZAW 42 (1924), p. 39f.

4. C. A. Simpson, The Early Tradition, p. 67f.

5. O. Eissfeldt, Hexateuch-Synopse (1922) loc. cit.

6. J. Pedersen, Israel I/II (1926) p. 248.

7. O. E. Ravn, "Der Turm zu Babel", ZDMG 91, p. 356 .

8. F. Wetzel, F. H. Weissbach, Das Hauptheiligtum des Marduk in Babylon (1938), p. 43 = S. Langdon, Die neubab. Koenigsinschr. (1912) p. 60f. I, 38f.

9. Pedersen, op. cit., p. 248.

10. Stade, ZAW 15 (1895) p. 157f.

11. J. G. Frazer, Folk-Lore in the O. T. (1919) I, p. 384 .

12. cf. S. R. Driver, Dictionary of the Bible IV (1902), p. 790.

13. The form bāb-ili in Accadian meaning "gate of god" might perhaps have been originally a popular etymology. cf. Boehl's discussion, ZAW 34 (1916) p. 110f. More probably, however, is that it is the correct derivation. cf. Unger, F. Babylon die heilige Stadt (1931) p. 25[1], 201ff.

14. G. Dalman, Aramäisch-Neuhebräisches Woerterbuch (1901), p. 53.

15. Herodotus, History I, 181. cf. for a bibliography and a discussion of the accuracy of Herodotus' description: O. E. Ravn, Herodotus' Description of Babylon (1942), W. Baumgartner, Archiv Orientální XVIII 1/2 (1950), p. 75ff.

16. E. Kraeling, JAOS 40 (1920), p. 276ff.

17. Wetzel and Weissbach, op. cit., p. 49f.

18. André Parrot, La Tour de Babel (1953), p. 17; cf. Parrot, Ziggurats et Tour de Babel (1949)

Footnotes to Chapter VI

19. cf. H. J. Lenzen, Die Entwicklung der Ziggurat (1941) and Th. A. Busink, De babylonische Tempeltoren (1949). The older works of W. Andrae, E. Unger and Th. Dombart are also still valuable, although in places out-of-date through the more recent discoveries.

20. Busink, op. cit., p. 43f; for a detailed discussion L. Wooley, Ur Excavations Vol.V: The Ziggurat and Its Surroundings (1939).

21. E. Unger, op. cit., p. 191ff.

22. Lenzen, op. cit., p. 55ff; Busink, op. cit., p. 74ff.

23. This view was held somewhat reservedly by Moberg, Babels torn (1918) p. 73: "Bärget spelar en dominerande roll i sumerernas religiösa föreställnings- och uttryckssätt, så betydande, att man har svårt att tänka sig, att detta icke måste hava utbildats i bärgstrakter, från vilka folket sedan flyttat ned i flodlandet. Vad vore då naturligare att tänka, än att folkets gud, van att bo på bärgshöjderna, även där krävde ett bärg för sin trivsel?"

24. Th. Dombart, Ziggurat und Pyramide (1915), p. 75.

25. Andrae, Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, 30 (1927) p. 1033ff.

26. Andrae, Handbuch der Archaeologie (1939), p. 685 n. 2.

27. Schott, Zeitschrift fuer Assyriologie, 40 (1931) p. 14.

28. L. H. Vincent, "De la Tour de Babel au Temple" RB 53 (1946) p. 435-6.

29. Lenzen, op. cit. p. 55ff.

30. Busink, op. cit., p. 77ff.

31. Albright, JBL 58, p. 99.

32. Gressmann-Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums, p. 493f.
A. Jeremias, ATAO^3 p. 190ff.

33. Eusebius, Chr., ed. Schoene I, p. 23.

Life History

I, Brevard Springs Childs, was born on September 2, 1923 in Columbia, South Carolina (USA), the third son of Richard Austin Childs and Reaux Jones Childs. When I was five years of age, my father moved to New York City for the sake of his business which was then real estate brokerage. I received my high school education at Bayside High School and the first two years of college at Queens College. The years from 1943 to 1945 were spent in military service. Following the war I completed my B. A. and M. A. degrees at the University of Michigan, and received in 1950 my B. D. degree at Princeton Theological Seminary. I studied at the University of Basel from 1950 to the summer of 1954 with the winter semester 1951/1952 spent at the University of Heidelberg. During this period I heard lectures from Professors Baumgartner, Eichrodt, Cullmann, K. L. Schmidt, Barth, von Rad, and G. Bornkamm. In July 1955 I was appointed professor of Old Testament at Mission House Seminary, Plymouth, Wisconsin.

I am especially indebted to Professors Baumgartner and Eichrodt for their constant help. Much of the literature cited was only obtainable from Prof. Baumgartner's personal library. His willingness in providing this material along with countless invaluable suggestions is greatly appreciated.